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-<?php
-
-/**
- * Random Number Generator
- *
- * PHP version 5
- *
- * Here's a short example of how to use this library:
- * <code>
- * <?php
- * include 'vendor/autoload.php';
- *
- * echo bin2hex(\phpseclib\Crypt\Random::string(8));
- * ?>
- * </code>
- *
- * @category Crypt
- * @package Random
- * @author Jim Wigginton <terrafrost@php.net>
- * @copyright 2007 Jim Wigginton
- * @license http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.html MIT License
- * @link http://phpseclib.sourceforge.net
- */
-
-namespace phpseclib\Crypt;
-
-/**
- * Pure-PHP Random Number Generator
- *
- * @package Random
- * @author Jim Wigginton <terrafrost@php.net>
- * @access public
- */
-class Random
-{
- /**
- * Generate a random string.
- *
- * Although microoptimizations are generally discouraged as they impair readability this function is ripe with
- * microoptimizations because this function has the potential of being called a huge number of times.
- * eg. for RSA key generation.
- *
- * @param int $length
- * @return string
- */
- static function string($length)
- {
- if (!$length) {
- return '';
- }
-
- if (version_compare(PHP_VERSION, '7.0.0', '>=')) {
- try {
- return \random_bytes($length);
- } catch (\Throwable $e) {
- // If a sufficient source of randomness is unavailable, random_bytes() will throw an
- // object that implements the Throwable interface (Exception, TypeError, Error).
- // We don't actually need to do anything here. The string() method should just continue
- // as normal. Note, however, that if we don't have a sufficient source of randomness for
- // random_bytes(), most of the other calls here will fail too, so we'll end up using
- // the PHP implementation.
- }
- }
-
- if (strtoupper(substr(PHP_OS, 0, 3)) === 'WIN') {
- // method 1. prior to PHP 5.3 this would call rand() on windows hence the function_exists('class_alias') call.
- // ie. class_alias is a function that was introduced in PHP 5.3
- if (extension_loaded('mcrypt') && function_exists('class_alias')) {
- return @mcrypt_create_iv($length);
- }
- // method 2. openssl_random_pseudo_bytes was introduced in PHP 5.3.0 but prior to PHP 5.3.4 there was,
- // to quote <http://php.net/ChangeLog-5.php#5.3.4>, "possible blocking behavior". as of 5.3.4
- // openssl_random_pseudo_bytes and mcrypt_create_iv do the exact same thing on Windows. ie. they both
- // call php_win32_get_random_bytes():
- //
- // https://github.com/php/php-src/blob/7014a0eb6d1611151a286c0ff4f2238f92c120d6/ext/openssl/openssl.c#L5008
- // https://github.com/php/php-src/blob/7014a0eb6d1611151a286c0ff4f2238f92c120d6/ext/mcrypt/mcrypt.c#L1392
- //
- // php_win32_get_random_bytes() is defined thusly:
- //
- // https://github.com/php/php-src/blob/7014a0eb6d1611151a286c0ff4f2238f92c120d6/win32/winutil.c#L80
- //
- // we're calling it, all the same, in the off chance that the mcrypt extension is not available
- if (extension_loaded('openssl') && version_compare(PHP_VERSION, '5.3.4', '>=')) {
- return openssl_random_pseudo_bytes($length);
- }
- } else {
- // method 1. the fastest
- if (extension_loaded('openssl')) {
- return openssl_random_pseudo_bytes($length);
- }
- // method 2
- static $fp = true;
- if ($fp === true) {
- // warning's will be output unles the error suppression operator is used. errors such as
- // "open_basedir restriction in effect", "Permission denied", "No such file or directory", etc.
- $fp = @fopen('/dev/urandom', 'rb');
- }
- if ($fp !== true && $fp !== false) { // surprisingly faster than !is_bool() or is_resource()
- return fread($fp, $length);
- }
- // method 3. pretty much does the same thing as method 2 per the following url:
- // https://github.com/php/php-src/blob/7014a0eb6d1611151a286c0ff4f2238f92c120d6/ext/mcrypt/mcrypt.c#L1391
- // surprisingly slower than method 2. maybe that's because mcrypt_create_iv does a bunch of error checking that we're
- // not doing. regardless, this'll only be called if this PHP script couldn't open /dev/urandom due to open_basedir
- // restrictions or some such
- if (extension_loaded('mcrypt')) {
- return @mcrypt_create_iv($length, MCRYPT_DEV_URANDOM);
- }
- }
- // at this point we have no choice but to use a pure-PHP CSPRNG
-
- // cascade entropy across multiple PHP instances by fixing the session and collecting all
- // environmental variables, including the previous session data and the current session
- // data.
- //
- // mt_rand seeds itself by looking at the PID and the time, both of which are (relatively)
- // easy to guess at. linux uses mouse clicks, keyboard timings, etc, as entropy sources, but
- // PHP isn't low level to be able to use those as sources and on a web server there's not likely
- // going to be a ton of keyboard or mouse action. web servers do have one thing that we can use
- // however, a ton of people visiting the website. obviously you don't want to base your seeding
- // soley on parameters a potential attacker sends but (1) not everything in $_SERVER is controlled
- // by the user and (2) this isn't just looking at the data sent by the current user - it's based
- // on the data sent by all users. one user requests the page and a hash of their info is saved.
- // another user visits the page and the serialization of their data is utilized along with the
- // server envirnment stuff and a hash of the previous http request data (which itself utilizes
- // a hash of the session data before that). certainly an attacker should be assumed to have
- // full control over his own http requests. he, however, is not going to have control over
- // everyone's http requests.
- static $crypto = false, $v;
- if ($crypto === false) {
- // save old session data
- $old_session_id = session_id();
- $old_use_cookies = ini_get('session.use_cookies');
- $old_session_cache_limiter = session_cache_limiter();
- $_OLD_SESSION = isset($_SESSION) ? $_SESSION : false;
- if ($old_session_id != '') {
- session_write_close();
- }
-
- session_id(1);
- ini_set('session.use_cookies', 0);
- session_cache_limiter('');
- session_start();
-
- $v = $seed = $_SESSION['seed'] = pack('H*', sha1(
- (isset($_SERVER) ? phpseclib_safe_serialize($_SERVER) : '') .
- (isset($_POST) ? phpseclib_safe_serialize($_POST) : '') .
- (isset($_GET) ? phpseclib_safe_serialize($_GET) : '') .
- (isset($_COOKIE) ? phpseclib_safe_serialize($_COOKIE) : '') .
- phpseclib_safe_serialize($GLOBALS) .
- phpseclib_safe_serialize($_SESSION) .
- phpseclib_safe_serialize($_OLD_SESSION)
- ));
- if (!isset($_SESSION['count'])) {
- $_SESSION['count'] = 0;
- }
- $_SESSION['count']++;
-
- session_write_close();
-
- // restore old session data
- if ($old_session_id != '') {
- session_id($old_session_id);
- session_start();
- ini_set('session.use_cookies', $old_use_cookies);
- session_cache_limiter($old_session_cache_limiter);
- } else {
- if ($_OLD_SESSION !== false) {
- $_SESSION = $_OLD_SESSION;
- unset($_OLD_SESSION);
- } else {
- unset($_SESSION);
- }
- }
-
- // in SSH2 a shared secret and an exchange hash are generated through the key exchange process.
- // the IV client to server is the hash of that "nonce" with the letter A and for the encryption key it's the letter C.
- // if the hash doesn't produce enough a key or an IV that's long enough concat successive hashes of the
- // original hash and the current hash. we'll be emulating that. for more info see the following URL:
- //
- // http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#section-7.2
- //
- // see the is_string($crypto) part for an example of how to expand the keys
- $key = pack('H*', sha1($seed . 'A'));
- $iv = pack('H*', sha1($seed . 'C'));
-
- // ciphers are used as per the nist.gov link below. also, see this link:
- //
- // http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographically_secure_pseudorandom_number_generator#Designs_based_on_cryptographic_primitives
- switch (true) {
- case class_exists('\phpseclib\Crypt\AES'):
- $crypto = new AES(Base::MODE_CTR);
- break;
- case class_exists('\phpseclib\Crypt\Twofish'):
- $crypto = new Twofish(Base::MODE_CTR);
- break;
- case class_exists('\phpseclib\Crypt\Blowfish'):
- $crypto = new Blowfish(Base::MODE_CTR);
- break;
- case class_exists('\phpseclib\Crypt\TripleDES'):
- $crypto = new TripleDES(Base::MODE_CTR);
- break;
- case class_exists('\phpseclib\Crypt\DES'):
- $crypto = new DES(Base::MODE_CTR);
- break;
- case class_exists('\phpseclib\Crypt\RC4'):
- $crypto = new RC4();
- break;
- default:
- user_error(__CLASS__ . ' requires at least one symmetric cipher be loaded');
- return false;
- }
-
- $crypto->setKey($key);
- $crypto->setIV($iv);
- $crypto->enableContinuousBuffer();
- }
-
- //return $crypto->encrypt(str_repeat("\0", $length));
-
- // the following is based off of ANSI X9.31:
- //
- // http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/rng/931rngext.pdf
- //
- // OpenSSL uses that same standard for it's random numbers:
- //
- // http://www.opensource.apple.com/source/OpenSSL/OpenSSL-38/openssl/fips-1.0/rand/fips_rand.c
- // (do a search for "ANS X9.31 A.2.4")
- $result = '';
- while (strlen($result) < $length) {
- $i = $crypto->encrypt(microtime()); // strlen(microtime()) == 21
- $r = $crypto->encrypt($i ^ $v); // strlen($v) == 20
- $v = $crypto->encrypt($r ^ $i); // strlen($r) == 20
- $result.= $r;
- }
- return substr($result, 0, $length);
- }
-}
-
-if (!function_exists('phpseclib_safe_serialize')) {
- /**
- * Safely serialize variables
- *
- * If a class has a private __sleep() method it'll give a fatal error on PHP 5.2 and earlier.
- * PHP 5.3 will emit a warning.
- *
- * @param mixed $arr
- * @access public
- */
- function phpseclib_safe_serialize(&$arr)
- {
- if (is_object($arr)) {
- return '';
- }
- if (!is_array($arr)) {
- return serialize($arr);
- }
- // prevent circular array recursion
- if (isset($arr['__phpseclib_marker'])) {
- return '';
- }
- $safearr = array();
- $arr['__phpseclib_marker'] = true;
- foreach (array_keys($arr) as $key) {
- // do not recurse on the '__phpseclib_marker' key itself, for smaller memory usage
- if ($key !== '__phpseclib_marker') {
- $safearr[$key] = phpseclib_safe_serialize($arr[$key]);
- }
- }
- unset($arr['__phpseclib_marker']);
- return serialize($safearr);
- }
-}