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/*
* Copyright (c) 2020, Ali Mohammad Pur <ali.mpfard@gmail.com>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <AK/Endian.h>
#include <AK/MemoryStream.h>
#include <LibCore/Timer.h>
#include <LibCrypto/ASN1/DER.h>
#include <LibCrypto/PK/Code/EMSA_PSS.h>
#include <LibTLS/TLSv12.h>
namespace TLS {
void TLSv12::write_packet(ByteBuffer& packet)
{
m_context.tls_buffer.append(packet.data(), packet.size());
if (m_context.connection_status > ConnectionStatus::Disconnected) {
if (!m_has_scheduled_write_flush) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Scheduling write of " << m_context.tls_buffer.size();
#endif
deferred_invoke([this](auto&) { write_into_socket(); });
m_has_scheduled_write_flush = true;
} else {
// multiple packet are available, let's flush some out
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Flushing scheduled write of " << m_context.tls_buffer.size();
#endif
write_into_socket();
// the deferred invoke is still in place
m_has_scheduled_write_flush = true;
}
}
}
void TLSv12::update_packet(ByteBuffer& packet)
{
u32 header_size = 5;
*(u16*)packet.offset_pointer(3) = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian((u16)(packet.size() - header_size));
if (packet[0] != (u8)MessageType::ChangeCipher) {
if (packet[0] == (u8)MessageType::Handshake && packet.size() > header_size) {
u8 handshake_type = packet[header_size];
if (handshake_type != HandshakeType::HelloRequest && handshake_type != HandshakeType::HelloVerifyRequest) {
update_hash(packet.slice_view(header_size, packet.size() - header_size));
}
}
if (m_context.cipher_spec_set && m_context.crypto.created) {
size_t length = packet.size() - header_size;
size_t block_size, padding, mac_size;
if (!is_aead()) {
block_size = m_aes_local.cbc->cipher().block_size();
// If the length is already a multiple a block_size,
// an entire block of padding is added.
// In short, we _never_ have no padding.
mac_size = mac_length();
length += mac_size;
padding = block_size - length % block_size;
length += padding;
} else {
block_size = m_aes_local.gcm->cipher().block_size();
padding = 0;
mac_size = 0; // AEAD provides its own authentication scheme.
}
if (m_context.crypto.created == 1) {
// `buffer' will continue to be encrypted
auto buffer = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(length);
size_t buffer_position = 0;
auto iv_size = iv_length();
// copy the packet, sans the header
buffer.overwrite(buffer_position, packet.offset_pointer(header_size), packet.size() - header_size);
buffer_position += packet.size() - header_size;
ByteBuffer ct;
if (is_aead()) {
// We need enough space for a header, the data, a tag, and the IV
ct = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(length + header_size + iv_size + 16);
// copy the header over
ct.overwrite(0, packet.data(), header_size - 2);
// AEAD AAD (13)
// Seq. no (8)
// content type (1)
// version (2)
// length (2)
u8 aad[13];
Bytes aad_bytes { aad, 13 };
OutputMemoryStream aad_stream { aad_bytes };
u64 seq_no = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(m_context.local_sequence_number);
u16 len = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian((u16)(packet.size() - header_size));
aad_stream.write({ &seq_no, sizeof(seq_no) });
aad_stream.write(packet.bytes().slice(0, 3)); // content-type + version
aad_stream.write({ &len, sizeof(len) }); // length
ASSERT(aad_stream.is_end());
// AEAD IV (12)
// IV (4)
// (Nonce) (8)
// -- Our GCM impl takes 16 bytes
// zero (4)
u8 iv[16];
Bytes iv_bytes { iv, 16 };
Bytes { m_context.crypto.local_aead_iv, 4 }.copy_to(iv_bytes);
AK::fill_with_random(iv_bytes.offset(4), 8);
memset(iv_bytes.offset(12), 0, 4);
// write the random part of the iv out
iv_bytes.slice(4, 8).copy_to(ct.bytes().slice(header_size));
// Write the encrypted data and the tag
m_aes_local.gcm->encrypt(
packet.bytes().slice(header_size, length),
ct.bytes().slice(header_size + 8, length),
iv_bytes,
aad_bytes,
ct.bytes().slice(header_size + 8 + length, 16));
ASSERT(header_size + 8 + length + 16 == ct.size());
} else {
// We need enough space for a header, iv_length bytes of IV and whatever the packet contains
ct = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(length + header_size + iv_size);
// copy the header over
ct.overwrite(0, packet.data(), header_size - 2);
// get the appropricate HMAC value for the entire packet
auto mac = hmac_message(packet, {}, mac_size, true);
// write the MAC
buffer.overwrite(buffer_position, mac.data(), mac.size());
buffer_position += mac.size();
// Apply the padding (a packet MUST always be padded)
memset(buffer.offset_pointer(buffer_position), padding - 1, padding);
buffer_position += padding;
ASSERT(buffer_position == buffer.size());
auto iv = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(iv_size);
AK::fill_with_random(iv.data(), iv.size());
// write it into the ciphertext portion of the message
ct.overwrite(header_size, iv.data(), iv.size());
ASSERT(header_size + iv_size + length == ct.size());
ASSERT(length % block_size == 0);
// get a block to encrypt into
auto view = ct.bytes().slice(header_size + iv_size, length);
m_aes_local.cbc->encrypt(buffer, view, iv);
}
// store the correct ciphertext length into the packet
u16 ct_length = (u16)ct.size() - header_size;
*(u16*)ct.offset_pointer(header_size - 2) = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(ct_length);
// replace the packet with the ciphertext
packet = ct;
}
}
}
++m_context.local_sequence_number;
}
void TLSv12::update_hash(const ByteBuffer& message)
{
m_context.handshake_hash.update(message);
}
ByteBuffer TLSv12::hmac_message(const ReadonlyBytes& buf, const Optional<ReadonlyBytes> buf2, size_t mac_length, bool local)
{
u64 sequence_number = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(local ? m_context.local_sequence_number : m_context.remote_sequence_number);
ensure_hmac(mac_length, local);
auto& hmac = local ? *m_hmac_local : *m_hmac_remote;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "========================= PACKET DATA ==========================";
print_buffer((const u8*)&sequence_number, sizeof(u64));
print_buffer(buf.data(), buf.size());
if (buf2.has_value())
print_buffer(buf2.value().data(), buf2.value().size());
dbg() << "========================= PACKET DATA ==========================";
#endif
hmac.update((const u8*)&sequence_number, sizeof(u64));
hmac.update(buf);
if (buf2.has_value() && buf2.value().size()) {
hmac.update(buf2.value());
}
auto digest = hmac.digest();
auto mac = ByteBuffer::copy(digest.immutable_data(), digest.data_length());
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "HMAC of the block for sequence number " << sequence_number;
print_buffer(mac);
#endif
return mac;
}
ssize_t TLSv12::handle_message(const ByteBuffer& buffer)
{
auto res { 5ll };
size_t header_size = res;
ssize_t payload_res = 0;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "buffer size: " << buffer.size();
#endif
if (buffer.size() < 5) {
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
auto type = (MessageType)buffer[0];
size_t buffer_position { 1 };
// FIXME: Read the version and verify it
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
auto version = (Version) * (const u16*)buffer.offset_pointer(buffer_position);
dbg() << "type: " << (u8)type << " version: " << (u16)version;
#endif
buffer_position += 2;
auto length = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(*(const u16*)buffer.offset_pointer(buffer_position));
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "record length: " << length << " at offset: " << buffer_position;
#endif
buffer_position += 2;
if (buffer_position + length > buffer.size()) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "record length more than what we have: " << buffer.size();
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "message type: " << (u8)type << ", length: " << length;
#endif
ByteBuffer plain = buffer.slice_view(buffer_position, buffer.size() - buffer_position);
if (m_context.cipher_spec_set && type != MessageType::ChangeCipher) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Encrypted: ";
print_buffer(buffer.slice_view(header_size, length));
#endif
if (is_aead()) {
ASSERT(m_aes_remote.gcm);
if (length < 24) {
dbg() << "Invalid packet length";
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::DecryptError);
write_packet(packet);
return (i8)Error::BrokenPacket;
}
auto packet_length = length - iv_length() - 16;
auto payload = plain.bytes();
auto decrypted = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(packet_length);
// AEAD AAD (13)
// Seq. no (8)
// content type (1)
// version (2)
// length (2)
u8 aad[13];
Bytes aad_bytes { aad, 13 };
OutputMemoryStream aad_stream { aad_bytes };
u64 seq_no = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(m_context.remote_sequence_number);
u16 len = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian((u16)packet_length);
aad_stream.write({ &seq_no, sizeof(seq_no) }); // Sequence number
aad_stream.write(buffer.bytes().slice(0, header_size - 2)); // content-type + version
aad_stream.write({ &len, sizeof(u16) });
ASSERT(aad_stream.is_end());
auto nonce = payload.slice(0, iv_length());
payload = payload.slice(iv_length());
// AEAD IV (12)
// IV (4)
// (Nonce) (8)
// -- Our GCM impl takes 16 bytes
// zero (4)
u8 iv[16];
Bytes iv_bytes { iv, 16 };
Bytes { m_context.crypto.remote_aead_iv, 4 }.copy_to(iv_bytes);
nonce.copy_to(iv_bytes.slice(4));
memset(iv_bytes.offset(12), 0, 4);
auto ciphertext = payload.slice(0, payload.size() - 16);
auto tag = payload.slice(ciphertext.size());
auto consistency = m_aes_remote.gcm->decrypt(
ciphertext,
decrypted,
iv_bytes,
aad_bytes,
tag);
if (consistency != Crypto::VerificationConsistency::Consistent) {
dbg() << "integrity check failed (tag length " << tag.size() << ")";
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::BadRecordMAC);
write_packet(packet);
return (i8)Error::IntegrityCheckFailed;
}
plain = decrypted;
} else {
ASSERT(m_aes_remote.cbc);
auto iv_size = iv_length();
auto decrypted = m_aes_remote.cbc->create_aligned_buffer(length - iv_size);
auto iv = buffer.slice_view(header_size, iv_size);
Bytes decrypted_span = decrypted;
m_aes_remote.cbc->decrypt(buffer.bytes().slice(header_size + iv_size, length - iv_size), decrypted_span, iv);
length = decrypted_span.size();
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Decrypted: ";
print_buffer(decrypted);
#endif
auto mac_size = mac_length();
if (length < mac_size) {
dbg() << "broken packet";
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::DecryptError);
write_packet(packet);
return (i8)Error::BrokenPacket;
}
length -= mac_size;
const u8* message_hmac = decrypted_span.offset(length);
u8 temp_buf[5];
memcpy(temp_buf, buffer.offset_pointer(0), 3);
*(u16*)(temp_buf + 3) = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(length);
auto hmac = hmac_message({ temp_buf, 5 }, decrypted_span.slice(0, length), mac_size);
auto message_mac = ByteBuffer::wrap(const_cast<u8*>(message_hmac), mac_size);
if (hmac != message_mac) {
dbg() << "integrity check failed (mac length " << mac_size << ")";
dbg() << "mac received:";
print_buffer(message_mac);
dbg() << "mac computed:";
print_buffer(hmac);
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::BadRecordMAC);
write_packet(packet);
return (i8)Error::IntegrityCheckFailed;
}
plain = decrypted.slice(0, length);
}
}
m_context.remote_sequence_number++;
switch (type) {
case MessageType::ApplicationData:
if (m_context.connection_status != ConnectionStatus::Established) {
dbg() << "unexpected application data";
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage);
write_packet(packet);
} else {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "application data message of size " << plain.size();
#endif
m_context.application_buffer.append(plain.data(), plain.size());
}
break;
case MessageType::Handshake:
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "tls handshake message";
#endif
payload_res = handle_payload(plain);
break;
case MessageType::ChangeCipher:
if (m_context.connection_status != ConnectionStatus::KeyExchange) {
dbg() << "unexpected change cipher message";
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage);
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
} else {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "change cipher spec message";
#endif
m_context.cipher_spec_set = true;
m_context.remote_sequence_number = 0;
}
break;
case MessageType::Alert:
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "alert message of length " << length;
#endif
if (length >= 2) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
print_buffer(plain);
#endif
auto level = plain[0];
auto code = plain[1];
if (level == (u8)AlertLevel::Critical) {
dbg() << "We were alerted of a critical error: " << code << " (" << alert_name((AlertDescription)code) << ")";
m_context.critical_error = code;
try_disambiguate_error();
res = (i8)Error::UnknownError;
} else {
dbg() << "Alert: " << code;
}
if (code == 0) {
// close notify
res += 2;
alert(AlertLevel::Critical, AlertDescription::CloseNotify);
m_context.connection_finished = true;
if (!m_context.cipher_spec_set) {
// AWS CloudFront hits this.
dbg() << "Server sent a close notify and we haven't agreed on a cipher suite. Treating it as a handshake failure.";
m_context.critical_error = (u8)AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure;
try_disambiguate_error();
}
}
m_context.error_code = (Error)code;
}
break;
default:
dbg() << "message not understood";
return (i8)Error::NotUnderstood;
}
if (payload_res < 0)
return payload_res;
if (res > 0)
return header_size + length;
return res;
}
}
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