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/*
* Copyright (c) 2018-2020, Andreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>
* Copyright (c) 2021, Max Wipfli <mail@maxwipfli.ch>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
*/
#include <AK/StringView.h>
#include <Kernel/FileSystem/Custody.h>
#include <Kernel/FileSystem/VirtualFileSystem.h>
#include <Kernel/KLexicalPath.h>
#include <Kernel/Process.h>
namespace Kernel {
static void update_intermediate_node_permissions(UnveilNode& root_node, UnveilAccess new_permissions)
{
for (auto& entry : root_node.children()) {
auto& node = static_cast<UnveilNode&>(*entry.value);
if (node.was_explicitly_unveiled())
continue;
node.set_metadata({ node.path(), new_permissions, node.was_explicitly_unveiled() });
update_intermediate_node_permissions(node, new_permissions);
}
}
KResultOr<FlatPtr> Process::sys$unveil(Userspace<const Syscall::SC_unveil_params*> user_params)
{
VERIFY_PROCESS_BIG_LOCK_ACQUIRED(this)
Syscall::SC_unveil_params params;
if (!copy_from_user(¶ms, user_params))
return EFAULT;
if (!params.path.characters && !params.permissions.characters) {
m_veil_state = VeilState::Locked;
return 0;
}
if (m_veil_state == VeilState::Locked)
return EPERM;
if (!params.path.characters || !params.permissions.characters)
return EINVAL;
if (params.permissions.length > 5)
return EINVAL;
auto path_or_error = get_syscall_path_argument(params.path);
if (path_or_error.is_error())
return path_or_error.error();
auto& path = *path_or_error.value();
if (path.is_empty() || !path.view().starts_with('/'))
return EINVAL;
auto permissions = copy_string_from_user(params.permissions);
if (permissions.is_null())
return EFAULT;
// Let's work out permissions first...
unsigned new_permissions = 0;
for (const char permission : permissions) {
switch (permission) {
case 'r':
new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::Read;
break;
case 'w':
new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::Write;
break;
case 'x':
new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::Execute;
break;
case 'c':
new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::CreateOrRemove;
break;
case 'b':
new_permissions |= UnveilAccess::Browse;
break;
default:
return EINVAL;
}
}
// Now, let's try and resolve the path and obtain custody of the inode on the disk, and if not, bail out with
// the error from resolve_path_without_veil()
// However, if the user specified unveil() with "c" permissions, we don't set errno if ENOENT is encountered,
// because they most likely intend the program to create the file for them later on.
// If this case is encountered, the parent node of the path is returned and the custody of that inode is used instead.
RefPtr<Custody> parent_custody; // Parent inode in case of ENOENT
OwnPtr<KString> new_unveiled_path;
auto custody_or_error = VirtualFileSystem::the().resolve_path_without_veil(path.view(), root_directory(), &parent_custody);
if (!custody_or_error.is_error()) {
new_unveiled_path = custody_or_error.value()->try_create_absolute_path();
if (!new_unveiled_path)
return ENOMEM;
} else if (custody_or_error.error() == -ENOENT && parent_custody && (new_permissions & UnveilAccess::CreateOrRemove)) {
auto parent_custody_path = parent_custody->try_create_absolute_path();
if (!parent_custody_path)
return ENOMEM;
new_unveiled_path = KLexicalPath::try_join(parent_custody_path->view(), KLexicalPath::basename(path.view()));
if (!new_unveiled_path)
return ENOMEM;
} else {
// FIXME Should this be EINVAL?
return custody_or_error.error();
}
auto path_parts = KLexicalPath::parts(new_unveiled_path->view());
auto it = path_parts.begin();
auto& matching_node = m_unveiled_paths.traverse_until_last_accessible_node(it, path_parts.end());
if (it.is_end()) {
// If the path has already been explicitly unveiled, do not allow elevating its permissions.
if (matching_node.was_explicitly_unveiled()) {
if (new_permissions & ~matching_node.permissions())
return EPERM;
}
// It is possible that nodes that are "grandchildren" of the matching node have already been unveiled.
// This means that there may be intermediate nodes between this one and the unveiled "grandchildren"
// that inherited the current node's previous permissions. Those nodes now need their permissions
// updated to match the current node.
if (matching_node.permissions() != new_permissions)
update_intermediate_node_permissions(matching_node, (UnveilAccess)new_permissions);
matching_node.set_metadata({ matching_node.path(), (UnveilAccess)new_permissions, true });
m_veil_state = VeilState::Dropped;
return 0;
}
matching_node.insert(
it,
path_parts.end(),
{ new_unveiled_path->view(), (UnveilAccess)new_permissions, true },
[](auto& parent, auto& it) -> Optional<UnveilMetadata> {
auto path = String::formatted("{}/{}", parent.path(), *it);
return UnveilMetadata { path, parent.permissions(), false };
});
VERIFY(m_veil_state != VeilState::Locked);
m_veil_state = VeilState::Dropped;
return 0;
}
}
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