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This will make it easier to support both string types at the same time
while we convert code, and tracking down remaining uses.
One big exception is Value::to_string() in LibJS, where the name is
dictated by the ToString AO.
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Each of these strings would previously rely on StringView's char const*
constructor overload, which would call __builtin_strlen on the string.
Since we now have operator ""sv, we can replace these with much simpler
versions. This opens the door to being able to remove
StringView(char const*).
No functional changes.
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Fixes #13869
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This fixes at least half of our LibC includes in the kernel. The source
of truth for errno codes and their description strings now lives in
Kernel/API/POSIX/errno.h as an enumeration, which LibC includes.
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This isn't a complete conversion to ErrorOr<void>, but a good chunk.
The end goal here is to propagate buffer allocation failures to the
caller, and allow the use of TRY() with formatting functions.
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POSIX mandates that it is placed there.
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The 'syscall-arguments' positional arg being required was
breaking the scenario where the user just passes the
'--list-syscalls' argument.
Instead, make the argument not required, and manually handle
the error path our selves.
Closes: #6574
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SPDX License Identifiers are a more compact / standardized
way of representing file license information.
See: https://spdx.dev/resources/use/#identifiers
This was done with the `ambr` search and replace tool.
ambr --no-parent-ignore --key-from-file --rep-from-file key.txt rep.txt *
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Good-bye LogStream. Long live AK::Format!
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(...and ASSERT_NOT_REACHED => VERIFY_NOT_REACHED)
Since all of these checks are done in release builds as well,
let's rename them to VERIFY to prevent confusion, as everyone is
used to assertions being compiled out in release.
We can introduce a new ASSERT macro that is specifically for debug
checks, but I'm doing this wholesale conversion first since we've
accumulated thousands of these already, and it's not immediately
obvious which ones are suitable for ASSERT.
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This found the previous bugs :^)
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Note that this should not change the behavior at all.
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This achieves two things:
- Programs can now intentionally perform arbitrary syscalls by calling
syscall(). This allows us to work on things like syscall fuzzing.
- It restricts the ability of userspace to make syscalls to a single
4KB page of code. In order to call the kernel directly, an attacker
must now locate this page and call through it.
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