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This commit updates the Clang toolchain's version to 13.0.0, which comes
with better C++20 support and improved handling of new features by
clang-format. Due to the newly enabled `-Bsymbolic-functions` flag, our
Clang binaries will only be 2-4% slower than if we dynamically linked
them, but we save hundreds of megabytes of disk space.
The `BuildClang.sh` script has been reworked to build the entire
toolchain in just three steps: one for the compiler, one for GNU
binutils, and one for the runtime libraries. This reduces the complexity
of the build script, and will allow us to modify the CI configuration to
only rebuild the libraries when our libc headers change.
Most of the compile flags have been moved out to a separate CMake cache
file, similarly to how the Android and Fuchsia toolchains are
implemented within the LLVM repo. This provides a nicer interface than
the heaps of command-line arguments.
We no longer build separate toolchains for each architecture, as the
same Clang binary can compile code for multiple targets.
The horrible mess that `SERENITY_CLANG_ARCH` was, has been removed in
this commit. Clang happily accepts an `i686-pc-serenity` target triple,
which matches what our GCC toolchain accepts.
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Replace the old logic where we would start with a host build, and swap
all the CMake compiler and target variables underneath it to trick
CMake into building for Serenity after we configured and built the Lagom
code generators.
The SuperBuild creates two ExternalProjects, one for Lagom and one for
Serenity. The Serenity project depends on the install stage for the
Lagom build. The SuperBuild also generates a CMakeToolchain file for the
Serenity build to use that replaces the old toolchain file that was only
used for Ports.
To ensure that code generators are rebuilt when core libraries such as
AK and LibCore are modified, developers will need to direct their manual
`ninja` invocations to the SuperBuild's binary directory instead of the
Serenity binary directory.
This commit includes warning coalescing and option style cleanup for the
affected CMakeLists in the Kernel, top level, and runtime support
libraries. A large part of the cleanup is replacing USE_CLANG_TOOLCHAIN
with the proper CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_ID variable, which will no longer be
confused by a host clang compiler.
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This adds just enough scaffolding to make cmake succeed.
The build falls over immediately.
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GCC implements `fputc`, `fputs` and `fwrite` as builtin functions, whose
`FILE*` argument is implicitly marked `__attribute__((nonnull))`. This
causes our `VERIFY(stream)` statements to be removed. This does not
happen with Clang, as they do not use the `nonnull` attribute in this
way.
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This bug was reintroduced by the removal of -fbuilding-gcc.
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The System V ABI for both x86 and x86_64 requires that the stack pointer
is 16-byte aligned on entry. Previously we did not align the stack
pointer properly.
As far as "main" was concerned the stack alignment was correct even
without this patch due to how the C++ _start function and the kernel
interacted, i.e. the kernel misaligned the stack as far as the ABI
was concerned but that misalignment (read: it was properly aligned for
a regular function call - but misaligned in terms of what the ABI
dictates) was actually expected by our _start function.
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This won't be necessary anymore after a toolchain rebuild.
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Take Kernel/UBSanitizer.cpp and make a copy in LibSanitizer.
We can use LibSanitizer to hold other sanitizers as people implement
them :^).
To enable UBSAN for LibC, DynamicLoader, and other low level system
libraries, LibUBSanitizer is built as a serenity_libc, and has a static
version for LibCStatic to use. The approach is the same as that taken in
Note that this means now UBSAN is enabled for code generators, Lagom,
Kernel, and Userspace with -DENABLE_UNDEFINED_SANTIZER=ON. In userspace
however, UBSAN is not deadly (yet).
Co-authored-by: ForLoveOfCats <ForLoveOfCats@vivaldi.net>
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This links the dynamic linker against libgcc.a instead of having
our own copy of the math functions.
For now we need to specify -fbuilding-libgcc as a hack to work
around a bug with the -nodefaultlibs flag. Once everyone is on
the latest toolchain version this can be removed.
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In a1720eed2a8e744f2cd6d99adae4dff1fbab309e I added this new test,
but missed that there were already some "unit tests" for LibC over
in Userland/Tests/LibC. So lets unify these two locations.
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LibC is no different than any other code, it should be unit tested where
appropriate / possible.
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GCC will insert various calls to pthread functions when compiling
C++ code with static initializers, even when the user doesn't link
their program against libpthread explicitly.
This is used to make static initializers thread-safe, e.g. when
building a library that does not itself use thread functionality
and thus does not link against libpthread - but is intended to
be used with other code that does use libpthread explicitly.
This makes these symbols available in libc.
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This reverts commit b1f1f5afcf8f3b8a3ca10bcb6aefa05fbb2b35be.
Unfortunately this broke dbgln() in the dynamic loader. We need to
figure out how to link libgcc into it properly.
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These are provided by libgcc.
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This achieves two things:
- Programs can now intentionally perform arbitrary syscalls by calling
syscall(). This allows us to work on things like syscall fuzzing.
- It restricts the ability of userspace to make syscalls to a single
4KB page of code. In order to call the kernel directly, an attacker
must now locate this page and call through it.
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Modify the user mode runtime to insert stack canaries to find stack corruptions.
The `-fstack-protector-strong` variant was chosen because it catches more
issues than vanilla `-fstack-protector`, but doesn't have substantial
performance impact like `-fstack-protector-all`.
Details:
-fstack-protector enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain:
* A character array larger than 8 bytes.
* An 8-bit integer array larger than 8 bytes.
* A call to alloca() with either a variable size or a constant size bigger than 8 bytes.
-fstack-protector-strong enables stack protection for vulnerable functions that contain:
* An array of any size and type.
* A call to alloca().
* A local variable that has its address taken.
Example of it catching corrupting in the `stack-smash` test:
```
courage ~ $ ./user/Tests/LibC/stack-smash
[+] Starting the stack smash ...
Error: Stack protector failure, stack smashing detected!
Shell: Job 1 (/usr/Tests/LibC/stack-smash) Aborted
```
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RTTI is still disabled for the Kernel, and for the Dynamic Loader. This
allows for much less awkward navigation of class heirarchies in LibCore,
LibGUI, LibWeb, and LibJS (eventually). Measured RootFS size increase
was < 1%, and libgui.so binary size was ~3.3%. The small binary size
increase here seems worth it :^)
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Use the GNU LD option --no-dynamic-linker. This allows uncommenting some
code in the Kernel that gets upset if your ELF interpreter has its own
interpreter.
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The dynamic loader exists as /usr/lib/Loader.so and is loaded by the
kernel when ET_DYN programs are executed.
The dynamic loader is responsible for loading the dependencies of the
main program, allocating TLS storage, preparing all loaded objects for
execution and finally jumping to the entry of the main program.
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