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These were using a mix of decimal, octal and hexadecimal for no reason.
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Sergey suggested that having a non-zero O_RDONLY would make some things
less confusing, and it seems like he's right about that.
We can now easily check read/write permissions separately instead of
dancing around with the bits.
This patch also fixes unveil() validation for O_RDWR which previously
forgot to check for "r" permission.
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This syscall is a complement to pledge() and adds the same sort of
incremental relinquishing of capabilities for filesystem access.
The first call to unveil() will "drop a veil" on the process, and from
now on, only unveiled parts of the filesystem are visible to it.
Each call to unveil() specifies a path to either a directory or a file
along with permissions for that path. The permissions are a combination
of the following:
- r: Read access (like the "rpath" promise)
- w: Write access (like the "wpath" promise)
- x: Execute access
- c: Create/remove access (like the "cpath" promise)
Attempts to open a path that has not been unveiled with fail with
ENOENT. If the unveiled path lacks sufficient permissions, it will fail
with EACCES.
Like pledge(), subsequent calls to unveil() with the same path can only
remove permissions, not add them.
Once you call unveil(nullptr, nullptr), the veil is locked, and it's no
longer possible to unveil any more paths for the process, ever.
This concept comes from OpenBSD, and their implementation does various
things differently, I'm sure. This is just a first implementation for
SerenityOS, and we'll keep improving on it as we go. :^)
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We should move towards using uintptr_t instead of u32 for pointers
everywhere, to prepare for an eventual 64-bit port.
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As suggested by Joshua, this commit adds the 2-clause BSD license as a
comment block to the top of every source file.
For the first pass, I've just added myself for simplicity. I encourage
everyone to add themselves as copyright holders of any file they've
added or modified in some significant way. If I've added myself in
error somewhere, feel free to replace it with the appropriate copyright
holder instead.
Going forward, all new source files should include a license header.
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The syscall is now called sys$open(), but it behaves like the old sys$openat().
In userspace, open_with_path_length() is made a wrapper over openat_with_path_length().
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Since a chroot is in many ways similar to a separate root mount, we can also
apply mount flags to it as if it was an actual mount. These flags will apply
whenever the chrooted process accesses its root directory, but not when other
processes access this same directory for the outside. Since it's common to
chdir("/") immediately after chrooting (so that files accessed through the
current directory inherit the same mount flags), this effectively allows one to
apply additional limitations to a process confined inside a chroot.
To this effect, sys$chroot() gains a mount_flags argument (exposed as
chroot_with_mount_flags() in userspace) which can be set to all the same values
as the flags argument for sys$mount(), and additionally to -1 to keep the flags
set for that file system. Note that passing 0 as mount_flags will unset any
flags that may have been set for the file system, not keep them.
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This patch implements basic support for OpenBSD-style pledge().
pledge() allows programs to incrementally reduce their set of allowed
syscalls, which are divided into categories that each make up a subset
of POSIX functionality.
If a process violates one of its pledged promises by attempting to call
a syscall that it previously said it wouldn't call, the process is
immediately terminated with an uncatchable SIGABRT.
This is by no means complete, and we'll need to add more checks in
various places to ensure that promises are being kept.
But it is pretty cool! :^)
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We now support these mount flags:
* MS_NODEV: disallow opening any devices from this file system
* MS_NOEXEC: disallow executing any executables from this file system
* MS_NOSUID: ignore set-user-id bits on executables from this file system
The fourth flag, MS_BIND, is defined, but currently ignored.
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O_EXEC is mentioned by POSIX, so let's have it. Currently, it is only used
inside the kernel to ensure the process has the right permissions when opening
an executable.
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At the moment, the actual flags are ignored, but we correctly propagate them all
the way from the original mount() syscall to each custody that resides on the
mounted FS.
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While I was updating syscalls to stop passing null-terminated strings,
I added some helpful struct types:
- StringArgument { const char*; size_t; }
- ImmutableBuffer<Data, Size> { const Data*; Size; }
- MutableBuffer<Data, Size> { Data*; Size; }
The Process class has some convenience functions for validating and
optionally extracting the contents from these structs:
- get_syscall_path_argument(StringArgument)
- validate_and_copy_string_from_user(StringArgument)
- validate(ImmutableBuffer)
- validate(MutableBuffer)
There's still so much code around this and I'm wondering if we should
generate most of it instead. Possible nice little project.
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This was the last remaining syscall that took a null-terminated string
and figured out how long it was by walking it in kernelspace *shudder*.
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The chroot() syscall now allows the superuser to isolate a process into
a specific subtree of the filesystem. This is not strictly permanent,
as it is also possible for a superuser to break *out* of a chroot, but
it is a useful mechanism for isolating unprivileged processes.
The VFS now uses the current process's root_directory() as the root for
path resolution purposes. The root directory is stored as an uncached
Custody in the Process object.
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Note that I'm developing some helper types in the Syscall namespace as
I go here. Once I settle on some nice types, I will convert all the
other syscalls to use them as well.
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The userspace execve() wrapper now measures all the strings and puts
them in a neat and tidy structure on the stack.
This way we know exactly how much to copy in the kernel, and we don't
have to use the SMAP-violating validate_read_str(). :^)
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As Sergey pointed out forever ago, this value is wrong after fork().
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We don't care to handle negative path lengths anyway.
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If we pass a null path to these syscall wrappers, just return EFAULT
directly from the wrapper instead of segfaulting by calling strlen().
This is a compromise, since we now have to pass the path length to the
kernel, so we can't rely on the kernel to tell us that the path is at
a bad memory address.
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Also, let's return EFAULT for nullptr at the LibC layer. We can't do
all bad addresses this way, but we can at least do null. :^)
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As mentioned in #917, the String destructor could potentially be
clobbering the errno. Use memcpy so that we do not need String at all.
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It's not pleasant having to deal with null-terminated strings as input
to syscalls, so let's get rid of them one by one.
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This was invoking the wrong syscall (getgroups), oops! We had not been
using it yet, so it makes sense.
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Separate some responsibilities:
ELFDynamicLoader is responsible for loading elf binaries from disk and
performing relocations, calling init functions, and eventually calling
finalizer functions.
ELFDynamicObject is a helper class to parse the .dynamic section of an
elf binary, or the table of Elf32_Dyn entries at the _DYNAMIC symbol.
ELFDynamicObject now owns the helper classes for Relocations, Symbols,
Sections and the like that ELFDynamicLoader will use to perform
relocations and symbol lookup.
Because these new helpers are constructed from offsets into the .dynamic
section within the loaded .data section of the binary, we don't need the
ELFImage for nearly as much of the loading processes as we did before.
Therefore we can remove most of the extra DynamicXXX classes and just
keep the one that lets us find the location of _DYNAMIC in the new ELF.
And finally, since we changed the name of the class that dlopen/dlsym
care about, we need to compile/link and use the new ELFDynamicLoader
class in LibC.
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Since nothing is using this, let's just remove it. That's one less
thing to worry about.
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This was a hack used to profile things before we had a proper profiler.
Since RDTSC is not available in userspace, this is not useful anymore.
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This requires gcc8 from ports to build the Toolchain.
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This code never worked, as was never used for anything. We can build
a much better SHM implementation on top of TmpFS or similar when we
get to the point when we need one.
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