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-rw-r--r--Base/etc/plsusers (renamed from Base/etc/sudoers)2
-rw-r--r--Base/usr/share/man/man8/pls.md4
-rw-r--r--Documentation/BuildInstructions.md4
-rwxr-xr-xMeta/build-root-filesystem.sh4
-rw-r--r--Userland/Utilities/pls.cpp171
5 files changed, 99 insertions, 86 deletions
diff --git a/Base/etc/sudoers b/Base/etc/plsusers
index a301b3aac1..24fbad1611 100644
--- a/Base/etc/sudoers
+++ b/Base/etc/plsusers
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# sudoers file
+# plsusers file
# Put any users you want to allow to run programs as root here
root
anon
diff --git a/Base/usr/share/man/man8/pls.md b/Base/usr/share/man/man8/pls.md
index 3bf540d374..131261340c 100644
--- a/Base/usr/share/man/man8/pls.md
+++ b/Base/usr/share/man/man8/pls.md
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ $ pls [command]
## Description
Executes a command as the root user (uid and gid 0), given that the user executing `pls` is located in
-the sudoers file.
+the plsusers file.
It is possible to execute commands that contain hyphenated options via the use of `--`, which signifies the
end of command options. For example:
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ $ pls -- ls -la
```
## Files
-/etc/sudoers - List of users that can run `pls`
+/etc/plsusers - List of users that can run `pls`
## Examples
diff --git a/Documentation/BuildInstructions.md b/Documentation/BuildInstructions.md
index 5ed034c240..62879aaab6 100644
--- a/Documentation/BuildInstructions.md
+++ b/Documentation/BuildInstructions.md
@@ -230,8 +230,8 @@ $ ninja run
Note that the `anon` user is able to become `root` without password by default, as a development convenience.
To prevent this, remove `anon` from the `wheel` group and he will no longer be able to run `/bin/su`.
-`anon` is also, by default, located in `/etc/sudoers`, meaning that they will be able to execute with root permission using `pls`.
-To prevent this, remove them from `/etc/sudoers`.
+`anon` is also, by default, located in `/etc/plsusers`, meaning that they will be able to execute with root permission using `pls`.
+To prevent this, remove them from `/etc/plsusers`.
On Linux, QEMU is significantly faster if it's able to use KVM. The run script will automatically enable KVM if `/dev/kvm` exists and is readable+writable by the current user.
diff --git a/Meta/build-root-filesystem.sh b/Meta/build-root-filesystem.sh
index 9249eef183..e80987b638 100755
--- a/Meta/build-root-filesystem.sh
+++ b/Meta/build-root-filesystem.sh
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ chmod 660 mnt/etc/WindowServer.ini
chown $window_uid:$window_gid mnt/etc/WindowServer.ini
echo "/bin/sh" > mnt/etc/shells
+chmod 0400 mnt/etc/plsusers
+chown 0:0 mnt/etc/plsusers
+
chown 0:$wheel_gid mnt/bin/su
chown 0:$wheel_gid mnt/bin/passwd
chown 0:$wheel_gid mnt/bin/ping
@@ -57,6 +60,7 @@ chown 0:$wheel_gid mnt/bin/traceroute
chown 0:$phys_gid mnt/bin/keymap
chown 0:$phys_gid mnt/bin/shutdown
chown 0:$phys_gid mnt/bin/reboot
+chown 0:$wheel_gid mnt/bin/pls
chown 0:0 mnt/boot/Kernel
chown 0:0 mnt/res/kernel.map
chmod 0400 mnt/res/kernel.map
diff --git a/Userland/Utilities/pls.cpp b/Userland/Utilities/pls.cpp
index eb56f2d333..7cfb1ecedb 100644
--- a/Userland/Utilities/pls.cpp
+++ b/Userland/Utilities/pls.cpp
@@ -1,35 +1,17 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2021 Jesse Buhagiar <jooster669@gmail.com>
- * All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, Jesse Buhagiar <jooster669@gmail.com>
*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
- * list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
- * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
- * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
- * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
- * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
- * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
- * CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
- * OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
- * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
*/
+#include <AK/LexicalPath.h>
#include <AK/String.h>
#include <AK/StringBuilder.h>
#include <AK/Types.h>
#include <AK/Vector.h>
#include <LibCore/Account.h>
#include <LibCore/ArgsParser.h>
+#include <LibCore/DirIterator.h>
#include <LibCore/File.h>
#include <LibCore/GetPassword.h>
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -37,38 +19,41 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+static constexpr mode_t EXPECTED_PERMS = (S_IFREG | S_IRUSR);
+
// Function Definitions
extern "C" int main(int arch, char** argv);
-int unveil_paths(const char*);
+bool unveil_paths(const char*);
// Unveil paths, given the current user's path and the command they want to execute
-int unveil_paths(const char* command)
+bool unveil_paths(const char* command)
{
- // Get the system path, split it and attempt to unveil all the paths.
- // We do NOT error out on an invalid path
- auto paths = String(getenv("PATH")).split(':');
- int num_unveils = 0;
- char path_buf[256];
+ bool did_unveil_ok = false;
- // Unveil each path
- for (const auto& path : paths) {
- if (unveil(path.characters(), "x") == 0)
- num_unveils++;
- }
+ // Attempt to unveil command via `realpath`
+ auto* command_path = realpath(command, nullptr);
- // Now unveil the command
- auto command_path = realpath(command, &path_buf[0]);
+ // Command found via `realpath` (meaning it was probably a locally executed program)
if (command_path) {
if (unveil(command_path, "x") == 0)
- num_unveils++;
+ did_unveil_ok = true;
+
+ free(command_path);
+ return did_unveil_ok;
}
- return num_unveils;
+ // Okay, so we couldn't find the actual file specified by the user, let's
+ // instead search PATH for it...
+ auto command_path_system = Core::find_executable_in_path(command);
+ if (command_path_system.is_empty())
+ return false;
+
+ if (unveil(command_path_system.characters(), "x") == 0)
+ did_unveil_ok = true;
+
+ return did_unveil_ok;
}
-// <kling> linusg: quaker: "please" feels quite long, how about "pls" :P
-// <kling> "pls rm -r crap" has a nice ring to it
-// lol
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
Vector<const char*> command;
@@ -82,12 +67,7 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
return 1;
}
- if (seteuid(0) < 0) {
- perror("seteuid");
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (unveil("/etc/sudoers", "r") < 0) {
+ if (unveil("/etc/plsusers", "r") < 0) {
perror("unveil");
return 1;
}
@@ -110,46 +90,66 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
// Unveil all paths in the user's PATH, as well as the command they've specified.
auto unveil_count = unveil_paths(command.at(0));
if (unveil_count == 0) {
- warnln("Failed to unveil paths!");
+ warnln("Error: Failed to unveil paths!");
return 1;
}
// Lock veil
unveil(nullptr, nullptr);
- const char* username = getlogin();
- auto sudoers_file_or_error = Core::File::open("/etc/sudoers", Core::IODevice::ReadOnly);
- bool user_found = false;
- if (sudoers_file_or_error.is_error()) {
- warnln("couldn't open /etc/sudoers!");
+ // Call `seteuid` so we can access `/etc/plsusers`
+ if (seteuid(0) < 0) {
+ perror("seteuid");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ // Check the permissions and owner of /etc/plsusers. This ensures the integrity of the file.
+ struct stat pls_users_stat;
+ if (stat("/etc/plsusers", &pls_users_stat) < 0) {
+ perror("stat");
return 1;
}
- for (auto line = sudoers_file_or_error.value()->line_begin(); !line.at_end(); ++line) {
+ if (pls_users_stat.st_mode != EXPECTED_PERMS) {
+ warnln("Error: /etc/plsusers has incorrect permissions.");
+ return 4;
+ }
+
+ if (pls_users_stat.st_uid != 0 && pls_users_stat.st_gid != 0) {
+ warnln("Error: /etc/plsusers is not owned by root.");
+ return 4;
+ }
+
+ auto pls_users_file_or_error = Core::File::open("/etc/plsusers", Core::OpenMode::ReadOnly);
+ if (pls_users_file_or_error.is_error()) {
+ warnln("Error: Could not open /etc/plsusers: {}", pls_users_file_or_error.error());
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ const char* username = getlogin();
+ bool user_found = false;
+ for (auto line = pls_users_file_or_error.value()->line_begin(); !line.at_end(); ++line) {
auto line_str = *line;
// Skip any comments
if (line_str.starts_with("#"))
continue;
- // Our user is in the sudoers file!
+ // Our user is in the plsusers file!
if (line_str.to_string() == username) {
user_found = true;
break;
}
}
- // User isn't in the sudoer's file
+ // User isn't in the plsusers file
if (!user_found) {
- warnln("{} is not in the sudoers file!", username);
+ warnln("{} is not in the plsusers file!", username);
return 2;
}
- // The user was in the sudoers file, now let's ask for their password to ensure that it's actually them...
- uid_t current_uid = getuid();
- auto account_or_error = (username)
- ? Core::Account::from_name(username)
- : Core::Account::from_uid(current_uid);
+ // The user was in the plsusers file, now let's ask for their password to ensure that it's actually them...
+ auto account_or_error = Core::Account::from_name(username);
if (account_or_error.is_error()) {
warnln("Core::Account::from_name: {}", account_or_error.error());
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
}
const auto& account = account_or_error.value();
+ uid_t current_uid = getuid();
if (current_uid != 0 && account.has_password()) {
auto password = Core::get_password();
if (password.is_error()) {
@@ -171,13 +172,20 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
}
// TODO: Support swapping users instead of just defaulting to root
- setgid(0);
- setuid(0);
+ if (setgid(0) < 0) {
+ perror("setgid");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (setuid(0) < 0) {
+ perror("setuid");
+ return 1;
+ }
// Build the arguments list passed to `execvpe`
Vector<const char*> exec_args;
- for (size_t i = 0; i < command.size(); i++) {
- exec_args.append(command.at(i));
+ for (const auto& arg : command) {
+ exec_args.append(arg);
}
// Always terminate with a NULL (to signal end of args list)
@@ -185,26 +193,27 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
// Build the environment arguments
StringBuilder builder;
+ Vector<String> env_args_str;
+
+ // TERM envvar
+ char* env_term = getenv("TERM");
- // Build SUDO_USER envvar
- builder.append("SUDO_USER=");
- builder.append(username);
- auto sudo_user = builder.build();
- builder.clear();
+ if (env_term != nullptr) {
+ builder.append("TERM=");
+ builder.append(env_term);
+ env_args_str.append(builder.build());
+ }
- // Build SUDO_COMMAND envvar
- builder.append("SUDO_COMMAND=");
- builder.append(command.at(0));
- auto sudo_command = builder.build();
- builder.clear();
+ Vector<const char*> env_args;
+ for (auto& arg : env_args_str) {
+ env_args.append(arg.characters());
+ }
- const char* envs[] = { "PROMPT=\\X\\u@\\h:\\w\\a\\e[33;1m\\h\\e[0m \\e[34;1m\\w\\e[0m \\p ",
- "TERM=xterm", "PAGER=more", "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin",
- sudo_user.characters(), sudo_command.characters(), nullptr };
+ // Arguments list must be terminated with NULL argument
+ env_args.append(nullptr);
// Execute the desired command
- int rc = execvpe(command.at(0), const_cast<char**>(exec_args.data()), const_cast<char**>(envs));
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if (execvpe(command.at(0), const_cast<char**>(exec_args.data()), const_cast<char**>(env_args.data())) < 0) {
perror("execvpe");
exit(1);
}