diff options
-rw-r--r-- | Kernel/API/Syscall.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Kernel/API/Unveil.h | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Kernel/FileSystem/SysFS/Subsystems/Kernel/Processes.cpp | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Kernel/Process.cpp | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Kernel/Process.h | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Kernel/Syscalls/execve.cpp | 21 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Kernel/Syscalls/fork.cpp | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Kernel/Syscalls/unveil.cpp | 120 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Userland/Libraries/LibC/unistd.cpp | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Userland/Libraries/LibCore/System.cpp | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Userland/Libraries/LibCore/System.h | 1 |
11 files changed, 161 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/Kernel/API/Syscall.h b/Kernel/API/Syscall.h index 4e40fdce16..f306e549b1 100644 --- a/Kernel/API/Syscall.h +++ b/Kernel/API/Syscall.h @@ -433,6 +433,7 @@ struct SC_pledge_params { }; struct SC_unveil_params { + int flags; StringArgument path; StringArgument permissions; }; diff --git a/Kernel/API/Unveil.h b/Kernel/API/Unveil.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7d116f8e41 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kernel/API/Unveil.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022, Liav A. <liavalb@hotmail.co.il> + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause + */ + +#pragma once + +#include <AK/EnumBits.h> +#include <AK/Types.h> + +namespace Kernel { + +enum class UnveilFlags : u32 { + None = 0, + CurrentProgram = 1 << 0, + AfterExec = 1 << 1, +}; + +AK_ENUM_BITWISE_OPERATORS(UnveilFlags); + +} diff --git a/Kernel/FileSystem/SysFS/Subsystems/Kernel/Processes.cpp b/Kernel/FileSystem/SysFS/Subsystems/Kernel/Processes.cpp index 50ddbf3b18..10500a3608 100644 --- a/Kernel/FileSystem/SysFS/Subsystems/Kernel/Processes.cpp +++ b/Kernel/FileSystem/SysFS/Subsystems/Kernel/Processes.cpp @@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ ErrorOr<void> SysFSOverallProcesses::try_generate(KBufferBuilder& builder) case VeilState::Locked: TRY(process_object.add("veil"sv, "Locked")); break; + case VeilState::LockedInherited: + // Note: We don't reveal if the locked state is either by our choice + // or someone else applied it. + TRY(process_object.add("veil"sv, "Locked")); + break; } } else { TRY(process_object.add("pledge"sv, ""sv)); diff --git a/Kernel/Process.cpp b/Kernel/Process.cpp index 5346a4880e..8fe1b42961 100644 --- a/Kernel/Process.cpp +++ b/Kernel/Process.cpp @@ -320,13 +320,14 @@ ErrorOr<NonnullLockRefPtr<Process>> Process::try_create(LockRefPtr<Thread>& firs new_address_space = TRY(Memory::AddressSpace::try_create(nullptr)); } auto unveil_tree = UnveilNode { TRY(KString::try_create("/"sv)), UnveilMetadata(TRY(KString::try_create("/"sv))) }; + auto exec_unveil_tree = UnveilNode { TRY(KString::try_create("/"sv)), UnveilMetadata(TRY(KString::try_create("/"sv))) }; auto credentials = TRY(Credentials::create(uid, gid, uid, gid, uid, gid, {})); - auto process = TRY(adopt_nonnull_lock_ref_or_enomem(new (nothrow) Process(move(name), move(credentials), ppid, is_kernel_process, move(current_directory), move(executable), tty, move(unveil_tree)))); + auto process = TRY(adopt_nonnull_lock_ref_or_enomem(new (nothrow) Process(move(name), move(credentials), ppid, is_kernel_process, move(current_directory), move(executable), tty, move(unveil_tree), move(exec_unveil_tree)))); TRY(process->attach_resources(new_address_space.release_nonnull(), first_thread, fork_parent)); return process; } -Process::Process(NonnullOwnPtr<KString> name, NonnullRefPtr<Credentials> credentials, ProcessID ppid, bool is_kernel_process, RefPtr<Custody> current_directory, RefPtr<Custody> executable, TTY* tty, UnveilNode unveil_tree) +Process::Process(NonnullOwnPtr<KString> name, NonnullRefPtr<Credentials> credentials, ProcessID ppid, bool is_kernel_process, RefPtr<Custody> current_directory, RefPtr<Custody> executable, TTY* tty, UnveilNode unveil_tree, UnveilNode exec_unveil_tree) : m_name(move(name)) , m_space(LockRank::None) , m_protected_data_lock(LockRank::None) @@ -335,6 +336,7 @@ Process::Process(NonnullOwnPtr<KString> name, NonnullRefPtr<Credentials> credent , m_current_directory(LockRank::None, move(current_directory)) , m_tty(tty) , m_unveil_data(LockRank::None, move(unveil_tree)) + , m_exec_unveil_data(LockRank::None, move(exec_unveil_tree)) , m_wait_blocker_set(*this) { // Ensure that we protect the process data when exiting the constructor. diff --git a/Kernel/Process.h b/Kernel/Process.h index a5bfa6ae90..bf0c1616c2 100644 --- a/Kernel/Process.h +++ b/Kernel/Process.h @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ enum class VeilState { None, Dropped, Locked, + LockedInherited, }; static constexpr FlatPtr futex_key_private_flag = 0b1; @@ -523,6 +524,9 @@ public: auto& unveil_data() { return m_unveil_data; } auto const& unveil_data() const { return m_unveil_data; } + auto& exec_unveil_data() { return m_exec_unveil_data; } + auto const& exec_unveil_data() const { return m_exec_unveil_data; } + bool wait_for_tracer_at_next_execve() const { return m_wait_for_tracer_at_next_execve; @@ -584,7 +588,7 @@ private: bool add_thread(Thread&); bool remove_thread(Thread&); - Process(NonnullOwnPtr<KString> name, NonnullRefPtr<Credentials>, ProcessID ppid, bool is_kernel_process, RefPtr<Custody> current_directory, RefPtr<Custody> executable, TTY* tty, UnveilNode unveil_tree); + Process(NonnullOwnPtr<KString> name, NonnullRefPtr<Credentials>, ProcessID ppid, bool is_kernel_process, RefPtr<Custody> current_directory, RefPtr<Custody> executable, TTY* tty, UnveilNode unveil_tree, UnveilNode exec_unveil_tree); static ErrorOr<NonnullLockRefPtr<Process>> try_create(LockRefPtr<Thread>& first_thread, NonnullOwnPtr<KString> name, UserID, GroupID, ProcessID ppid, bool is_kernel_process, RefPtr<Custody> current_directory = nullptr, RefPtr<Custody> executable = nullptr, TTY* = nullptr, Process* fork_parent = nullptr); ErrorOr<void> attach_resources(NonnullOwnPtr<Memory::AddressSpace>&&, LockRefPtr<Thread>& first_thread, Process* fork_parent); static ProcessID allocate_pid(); @@ -878,6 +882,7 @@ private: LockRefPtr<Timer> m_alarm_timer; SpinlockProtected<UnveilData> m_unveil_data; + SpinlockProtected<UnveilData> m_exec_unveil_data; OwnPtr<PerformanceEventBuffer> m_perf_event_buffer; diff --git a/Kernel/Syscalls/execve.cpp b/Kernel/Syscalls/execve.cpp index 713e1b8832..7026f6090b 100644 --- a/Kernel/Syscalls/execve.cpp +++ b/Kernel/Syscalls/execve.cpp @@ -560,9 +560,24 @@ ErrorOr<void> Process::do_exec(NonnullLockRefPtr<OpenFileDescription> main_progr m_environment = move(environment); TRY(m_unveil_data.with([&](auto& unveil_data) -> ErrorOr<void> { - unveil_data.state = VeilState::None; - unveil_data.paths.clear(); - unveil_data.paths.set_metadata({ TRY(KString::try_create("/"sv)), UnveilAccess::None, false }); + TRY(m_exec_unveil_data.with([&](auto& exec_unveil_data) -> ErrorOr<void> { + // Note: If we have exec unveil data being waiting to be dispatched + // to the current execve'd program, then we apply the unveil data and + // ensure it is locked in the new program. + if (exec_unveil_data.state == VeilState::Dropped) { + unveil_data.state = VeilState::LockedInherited; + exec_unveil_data.state = VeilState::None; + unveil_data.paths = TRY(exec_unveil_data.paths.deep_copy()); + } else { + unveil_data.state = VeilState::None; + exec_unveil_data.state = VeilState::None; + unveil_data.paths.clear(); + unveil_data.paths.set_metadata({ TRY(KString::try_create("/"sv)), UnveilAccess::None, false }); + } + exec_unveil_data.paths.clear(); + exec_unveil_data.paths.set_metadata({ TRY(KString::try_create("/"sv)), UnveilAccess::None, false }); + return {}; + })); return {}; })); diff --git a/Kernel/Syscalls/fork.cpp b/Kernel/Syscalls/fork.cpp index 0fdcd53bd4..111636a00e 100644 --- a/Kernel/Syscalls/fork.cpp +++ b/Kernel/Syscalls/fork.cpp @@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ ErrorOr<FlatPtr> Process::sys$fork(RegisterState& regs) }); })); + TRY(m_exec_unveil_data.with([&](auto& parent_exec_unveil_data) -> ErrorOr<void> { + return child->m_exec_unveil_data.with([&](auto& child_exec_unveil_data) -> ErrorOr<void> { + child_exec_unveil_data.state = parent_exec_unveil_data.state; + child_exec_unveil_data.paths = TRY(parent_exec_unveil_data.paths.deep_copy()); + return {}; + }); + })); + // Note: We take the spinlock of Process::all_instances list because we need // to ensure that when we take the jail spinlock of two processes that we don't // run into a deadlock situation because both processes compete over each other Jail's diff --git a/Kernel/Syscalls/unveil.cpp b/Kernel/Syscalls/unveil.cpp index 496791b03f..83e53cc5a0 100644 --- a/Kernel/Syscalls/unveil.cpp +++ b/Kernel/Syscalls/unveil.cpp @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include <AK/RefPtr.h> #include <AK/StringView.h> +#include <Kernel/API/Unveil.h> #include <Kernel/FileSystem/Custody.h> #include <Kernel/FileSystem/VirtualFileSystem.h> #include <Kernel/KLexicalPath.h> @@ -25,6 +26,55 @@ static void update_intermediate_node_permissions(UnveilNode& root_node, UnveilAc } } +static ErrorOr<void> update_unveil_data(Process::UnveilData& locked_unveil_data, StringView unveiled_path, UnveilAccess new_permissions) +{ + auto path_parts = KLexicalPath::parts(unveiled_path); + auto it = path_parts.begin(); + // Note: For the sake of completence, we check if the locked state was inherited + // by an execve'd sequence. If that is the case, just silently ignore this. + if (locked_unveil_data.state == VeilState::LockedInherited) + return {}; + // NOTE: We have to check again, since the veil may have been locked by another thread + // while we were parsing the arguments. + if (locked_unveil_data.state == VeilState::Locked) + return EPERM; + + auto& matching_node = locked_unveil_data.paths.traverse_until_last_accessible_node(it, path_parts.end()); + if (it.is_end()) { + // If the path has already been explicitly unveiled, do not allow elevating its permissions. + if (matching_node.was_explicitly_unveiled()) { + if (new_permissions & ~matching_node.permissions()) + return EPERM; + } + + // It is possible that nodes that are "grandchildren" of the matching node have already been unveiled. + // This means that there may be intermediate nodes between this one and the unveiled "grandchildren" + // that inherited the current node's previous permissions. Those nodes now need their permissions + // updated to match the current node. + if (matching_node.permissions() != new_permissions) + update_intermediate_node_permissions(matching_node, new_permissions); + + matching_node.metadata_value().explicitly_unveiled = true; + matching_node.metadata_value().permissions = new_permissions; + locked_unveil_data.state = VeilState::Dropped; + return {}; + } + + auto new_unveiled_path = TRY(KString::try_create(unveiled_path)); + TRY(matching_node.insert( + it, + path_parts.end(), + { move(new_unveiled_path), new_permissions, true }, + [](auto& parent, auto& it) -> ErrorOr<Optional<UnveilMetadata>> { + auto path = TRY(KString::formatted("{}/{}", parent.path(), *it)); + return UnveilMetadata(move(path), parent.permissions(), false); + })); + + VERIFY(locked_unveil_data.state != VeilState::Locked); + locked_unveil_data.state = VeilState::Dropped; + return {}; +} + ErrorOr<FlatPtr> Process::sys$unveil(Userspace<Syscall::SC_unveil_params const*> user_params) { VERIFY_NO_PROCESS_BIG_LOCK(this); @@ -35,7 +85,17 @@ ErrorOr<FlatPtr> Process::sys$unveil(Userspace<Syscall::SC_unveil_params const*> return 0; } - if (veil_state() == VeilState::Locked) + if (!((params.flags & to_underlying(UnveilFlags::CurrentProgram)) || (params.flags & to_underlying(UnveilFlags::AfterExec)))) + return EINVAL; + + // Note: If we inherited a locked state, then silently ignore the unveil request, + // and let the user program potentially deal with an ENOENT error later on. + if ((params.flags & static_cast<unsigned>(UnveilFlags::CurrentProgram)) && veil_state() == VeilState::LockedInherited) + return 0; + + // Note: We only lock the unveil state for current program, while allowing adding + // indefinitely unveil data before doing the actual exec(). + if ((params.flags & static_cast<unsigned>(UnveilFlags::CurrentProgram)) && veil_state() == VeilState::Locked) return EPERM; if (!params.path.characters || !params.permissions.characters) @@ -93,48 +153,24 @@ ErrorOr<FlatPtr> Process::sys$unveil(Userspace<Syscall::SC_unveil_params const*> return custody_or_error.release_error(); } - auto path_parts = KLexicalPath::parts(new_unveiled_path->view()); - auto it = path_parts.begin(); - return m_unveil_data.with([&](auto& unveil_data) -> ErrorOr<FlatPtr> { - // NOTE: We have to check again, since the veil may have been locked by another thread - // while we were parsing the arguments. - if (unveil_data.state == VeilState::Locked) - return EPERM; - - auto& matching_node = unveil_data.paths.traverse_until_last_accessible_node(it, path_parts.end()); - if (it.is_end()) { - // If the path has already been explicitly unveiled, do not allow elevating its permissions. - if (matching_node.was_explicitly_unveiled()) { - if (new_permissions & ~matching_node.permissions()) - return EPERM; - } - - // It is possible that nodes that are "grandchildren" of the matching node have already been unveiled. - // This means that there may be intermediate nodes between this one and the unveiled "grandchildren" - // that inherited the current node's previous permissions. Those nodes now need their permissions - // updated to match the current node. - if (matching_node.permissions() != new_permissions) - update_intermediate_node_permissions(matching_node, (UnveilAccess)new_permissions); - - matching_node.metadata_value().explicitly_unveiled = true; - matching_node.metadata_value().permissions = (UnveilAccess)new_permissions; - unveil_data.state = VeilState::Dropped; - return 0; - } + if (params.flags & static_cast<unsigned>(UnveilFlags::CurrentProgram)) { + TRY(unveil_data().with([&](auto& data) -> ErrorOr<void> { + TRY(update_unveil_data(data, new_unveiled_path->view(), static_cast<UnveilAccess>(new_permissions))); + return {}; + })); + } - TRY(matching_node.insert( - it, - path_parts.end(), - { new_unveiled_path.release_nonnull(), (UnveilAccess)new_permissions, true }, - [](auto& parent, auto& it) -> ErrorOr<Optional<UnveilMetadata>> { - auto path = TRY(KString::formatted("{}/{}", parent.path(), *it)); - return UnveilMetadata(move(path), parent.permissions(), false); - })); - - VERIFY(unveil_data.state != VeilState::Locked); - unveil_data.state = VeilState::Dropped; - return 0; - }); + if (params.flags & static_cast<unsigned>(UnveilFlags::AfterExec)) { + TRY(exec_unveil_data().with([&](auto& data) -> ErrorOr<void> { + // Note: The only valid way to get into this state is by using unveil before doing + // an actual exec with the UnveilFlags::AfterExec flag. Then this state is applied on + // the actual new program unveil data, and never on the m_exec_unveil_data. + VERIFY(data.state != VeilState::LockedInherited); + TRY(update_unveil_data(data, new_unveiled_path->view(), static_cast<UnveilAccess>(new_permissions))); + return {}; + })); + } + return 0; } } diff --git a/Userland/Libraries/LibC/unistd.cpp b/Userland/Libraries/LibC/unistd.cpp index d866e15165..b48dadec11 100644 --- a/Userland/Libraries/LibC/unistd.cpp +++ b/Userland/Libraries/LibC/unistd.cpp @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <AK/ScopedValueRollback.h> #include <AK/String.h> #include <AK/Vector.h> +#include <Kernel/API/Unveil.h> #include <LibCore/File.h> #include <alloca.h> #include <assert.h> @@ -965,6 +966,7 @@ int pledge(char const* promises, char const* execpromises) int unveil(char const* path, char const* permissions) { Syscall::SC_unveil_params params { + static_cast<int>(UnveilFlags::CurrentProgram), { path, path ? strlen(path) : 0 }, { permissions, permissions ? strlen(permissions) : 0 } }; diff --git a/Userland/Libraries/LibCore/System.cpp b/Userland/Libraries/LibCore/System.cpp index 39602c5846..3c1ab3264b 100644 --- a/Userland/Libraries/LibCore/System.cpp +++ b/Userland/Libraries/LibCore/System.cpp @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <unistd.h> #ifdef AK_OS_SERENITY +# include <Kernel/API/Unveil.h> # include <LibCore/Account.h> # include <LibSystem/syscall.h> # include <serenity.h> @@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ static ErrorOr<void> unveil_dynamic_loader() constexpr auto dynamic_loader_permissions = "x"sv; Syscall::SC_unveil_params params { + static_cast<int>(UnveilFlags::CurrentProgram), { dynamic_loader_path.characters_without_null_termination(), dynamic_loader_path.length() }, { dynamic_loader_permissions.characters_without_null_termination(), dynamic_loader_permissions.length() }, }; @@ -110,6 +112,20 @@ ErrorOr<void> unveil(StringView path, StringView permissions) TRY(unveil_dynamic_loader()); Syscall::SC_unveil_params params { + static_cast<int>(UnveilFlags::CurrentProgram), + { parsed_path.characters(), parsed_path.length() }, + { permissions.characters_without_null_termination(), permissions.length() }, + }; + int rc = syscall(SC_unveil, ¶ms); + HANDLE_SYSCALL_RETURN_VALUE("unveil", rc, {}); +} + +ErrorOr<void> unveil_after_exec(StringView path, StringView permissions) +{ + auto const parsed_path = TRY(Core::SessionManagement::parse_path_with_sid(path)); + + Syscall::SC_unveil_params params { + static_cast<int>(UnveilFlags::AfterExec), { parsed_path.characters(), parsed_path.length() }, { permissions.characters_without_null_termination(), permissions.length() }, }; diff --git a/Userland/Libraries/LibCore/System.h b/Userland/Libraries/LibCore/System.h index 0a47c4ead7..e0f49b0982 100644 --- a/Userland/Libraries/LibCore/System.h +++ b/Userland/Libraries/LibCore/System.h @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ namespace Core::System { ErrorOr<void> beep(); ErrorOr<void> pledge(StringView promises, StringView execpromises = {}); ErrorOr<void> unveil(StringView path, StringView permissions); +ErrorOr<void> unveil_after_exec(StringView path, StringView permissions); ErrorOr<void> sendfd(int sockfd, int fd); ErrorOr<int> recvfd(int sockfd, int options); ErrorOr<void> ptrace_peekbuf(pid_t tid, void const* tracee_addr, Bytes destination_buf); |