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authorAndreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>2021-03-10 19:59:46 +0100
committerAndreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>2021-03-10 22:30:02 +0100
commitcbcf891040e9921ff628fdda668c9738f358a178 (patch)
tree6f50101dc6c2993361fa4436923927faa98c6e14 /Kernel/Syscalls/setpgid.cpp
parent839d2d70a4bd73d9162a03430c20c1ee2e542331 (diff)
downloadserenity-cbcf891040e9921ff628fdda668c9738f358a178.zip
Kernel: Move select Process members into protected memory
Process member variable like m_euid are very valuable targets for kernel exploits and until now they have been writable at all times. This patch moves m_euid along with a whole bunch of other members into a new Process::ProtectedData struct. This struct is remapped as read-only memory whenever we don't need to write to it. This means that a kernel write primitive is no longer enough to overwrite a process's effective UID, you must first unprotect the protected data where the UID is stored. :^)
Diffstat (limited to 'Kernel/Syscalls/setpgid.cpp')
-rw-r--r--Kernel/Syscalls/setpgid.cpp22
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/Kernel/Syscalls/setpgid.cpp b/Kernel/Syscalls/setpgid.cpp
index f66629b004..f10fec2ebf 100644
--- a/Kernel/Syscalls/setpgid.cpp
+++ b/Kernel/Syscalls/setpgid.cpp
@@ -33,14 +33,14 @@ KResultOr<pid_t> Process::sys$getsid(pid_t pid)
{
REQUIRE_PROMISE(proc);
if (pid == 0)
- return m_sid.value();
+ return sid().value();
ScopedSpinLock lock(g_processes_lock);
auto process = Process::from_pid(pid);
if (!process)
return ESRCH;
- if (m_sid != process->m_sid)
+ if (sid() != process->sid())
return EPERM;
- return process->m_sid.value();
+ return process->sid().value();
}
KResultOr<pid_t> Process::sys$setsid()
@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ KResultOr<pid_t> Process::sys$setsid()
if (found_process_with_same_pgid_as_my_pid)
return EPERM;
// Create a new Session and a new ProcessGroup.
- m_sid = m_pid.value();
- m_pg = ProcessGroup::create(ProcessGroupID(m_pid.value()));
+ MutableProtectedData(*this)->sid = pid().value();
+ m_pg = ProcessGroup::create(ProcessGroupID(pid().value()));
m_tty = nullptr;
- return m_sid.value();
+ return sid().value();
}
KResultOr<pid_t> Process::sys$getpgid(pid_t pid)
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ KResultOr<int> Process::sys$setpgid(pid_t specified_pid, pid_t specified_pgid)
{
REQUIRE_PROMISE(proc);
ScopedSpinLock lock(g_processes_lock); // FIXME: Use a ProcessHandle
- ProcessID pid = specified_pid ? ProcessID(specified_pid) : m_pid;
+ ProcessID pid = specified_pid ? ProcessID(specified_pid) : this->pid();
if (specified_pgid < 0) {
// The value of the pgid argument is less than 0, or is not a value supported by the implementation.
return EINVAL;
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ KResultOr<int> Process::sys$setpgid(pid_t specified_pid, pid_t specified_pgid)
auto process = Process::from_pid(pid);
if (!process)
return ESRCH;
- if (process != this && process->ppid() != m_pid) {
+ if (process != this && process->ppid() != this->pid()) {
// The value of the pid argument does not match the process ID
// of the calling process or of a child process of the calling process.
return ESRCH;
@@ -114,21 +114,21 @@ KResultOr<int> Process::sys$setpgid(pid_t specified_pid, pid_t specified_pgid)
// The process indicated by the pid argument is a session leader.
return EPERM;
}
- if (process->ppid() == m_pid && process->sid() != sid()) {
+ if (process->ppid() == this->pid() && process->sid() != sid()) {
// The value of the pid argument matches the process ID of a child
// process of the calling process and the child process is not in
// the same session as the calling process.
return EPERM;
}
- ProcessGroupID new_pgid = specified_pgid ? ProcessGroupID(specified_pgid) : process->m_pid.value();
+ ProcessGroupID new_pgid = specified_pgid ? ProcessGroupID(specified_pgid) : process->pid().value();
SessionID current_sid = sid();
SessionID new_sid = get_sid_from_pgid(new_pgid);
if (new_sid != -1 && current_sid != new_sid) {
// Can't move a process between sessions.
return EPERM;
}
- if (new_sid == -1 && new_pgid != process->m_pid.value()) {
+ if (new_sid == -1 && new_pgid != process->pid().value()) {
// The value of the pgid argument is valid, but is not
// the calling pid, and is not an existing process group.
return EPERM;