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authorAndreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>2021-02-14 11:44:21 +0100
committerAndreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>2021-02-14 11:47:14 +0100
commit41883730206a10fa3043c87135418e829938ad65 (patch)
tree47d7f55eb146184dcce6b41cd5a22d3e8843254c /Kernel/Syscall.cpp
parent10b7f6b77eaf4e162f578139b75b1e2302966f49 (diff)
downloadserenity-41883730206a10fa3043c87135418e829938ad65.zip
Kernel: Fix TOCTOU in syscall entry region validation
We were doing stack and syscall-origin region validations before taking the big process lock. There was a window of time where those regions could then be unmapped/remapped by another thread before we proceed with our syscall. This patch closes that window, and makes sys$get_stack_bounds() rely on the fact that we now know the userspace stack pointer to be valid. Thanks to @BenWiederhake for spotting this! :^)
Diffstat (limited to 'Kernel/Syscall.cpp')
-rw-r--r--Kernel/Syscall.cpp4
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/Kernel/Syscall.cpp b/Kernel/Syscall.cpp
index 569a6434e9..f087d2a71f 100644
--- a/Kernel/Syscall.cpp
+++ b/Kernel/Syscall.cpp
@@ -169,6 +169,9 @@ void syscall_handler(TrapFrame* trap)
PANIC("Syscall from process with IOPL != 0");
}
+ // NOTE: We take the big process lock before inspecting memory regions.
+ process.big_lock().lock();
+
if (!MM.validate_user_stack(process, VirtualAddress(regs.userspace_esp))) {
dbgln("Invalid stack pointer: {:p}", regs.userspace_esp);
handle_crash(regs, "Bad stack on syscall entry", SIGSTKFLT);
@@ -190,7 +193,6 @@ void syscall_handler(TrapFrame* trap)
handle_crash(regs, "Syscall from non-syscall region", SIGSEGV);
}
- process.big_lock().lock();
u32 function = regs.eax;
u32 arg1 = regs.edx;
u32 arg2 = regs.ecx;