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authorSergey Bugaev <bugaevc@serenityos.org>2020-05-28 17:56:25 +0300
committerAndreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>2020-05-29 07:53:30 +0200
commitfdb71cdf8fa6c48b226e2242fbfdd75216e2f442 (patch)
treea6ab0f769c534ff8c5ce88be595e994ad4193d6c /Kernel/CommandLine.cpp
parentb9051263658c405a69bd8bd8030420157d3ca0e0 (diff)
downloadserenity-fdb71cdf8fa6c48b226e2242fbfdd75216e2f442.zip
Kernel: Support read-only filesystem mounts
This adds support for MS_RDONLY, a mount flag that tells the kernel to disallow any attempts to write to the newly mounted filesystem. As this flag is per-mount, and different mounts of the same filesystems (such as in case of bind mounts) can have different mutability settings, you have to go though a custody to find out if the filesystem is mounted read-only, instead of just asking the filesystem itself whether it's inherently read-only. This also adds a lot of checks we were previously missing; and moves some of them to happen after more specific checks (such as regular permission checks). One outstanding hole in this system is sys$mprotect(PROT_WRITE), as there's no way we can know if the original file description this region has been mounted from had been opened through a readonly mount point. Currently, we always allow such sys$mprotect() calls to succeed, which effectively allows anyone to circumvent the effect of MS_RDONLY. We should solve this one way or another.
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