Base: Document unveil(2)

Also, escape underscores in chroot_with_mount_flags.

3 files changed, 93 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/Base/usr/share/man/man2/chroot.md b/Base/usr/share/man/man2/chroot.md
index 1745d0eb2b..6bbee05a2a 100644
--- a/Base/usr/share/man/man2/chroot.md
+++ b/Base/usr/share/man/man2/chroot.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ## Name
 
-chroot, chroot_with_mount_flags - change filesystem root
+chroot, chroot\_with\_mount\_flags - change filesystem root
 
 ## Synopsis
 
diff --git a/Base/usr/share/man/man2/pledge.md b/Base/usr/share/man/man2/pledge.md
index 78df718c76..40fb452ee9 100644
--- a/Base/usr/share/man/man2/pledge.md
+++ b/Base/usr/share/man/man2/pledge.md
@@ -56,3 +56,7 @@ Promises marked with an asterisk (\*) are SerenityOS specific extensions not sup
 ## History
 
 The `pledge()` system call was first introduced by OpenBSD. The implementation in SerenityOS differs in many ways and is by no means final.
+
+## See also
+
+* [`unveil`(2)](unveil.md)
diff --git a/Base/usr/share/man/man2/unveil.md b/Base/usr/share/man/man2/unveil.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c33c963d3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Base/usr/share/man/man2/unveil.md
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+## Name
+
+unveil - restrict filesystem access
+
+## Synopsis
+
+```**c++
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+int unveil(const char* path, const char* permissions);
+```
+
+## Description
+
+`unveil()` manipulates the process veil. The veil is a whitelist of paths on
+the file system the calling process is allowed to access.
+
+A process that has not made any `unveil()` calls is allowed to access the whole
+filesystem (subject to the regular permission checks). A process that has made
+one or more `unveil()` calls cannot access any paths excpet those that were
+explicitly unveiled.
+
+Calling `unveil()` allows the process to access the given `path`, which must be
+an absolute path, according to the given `permissions` string, which may
+include the following characters:
+
+* `r`: May read a file at this path
+* `w`: May write to a file at this path
+* `x`: May execute a program image at this path
+* `c`: May create or remove a file at this path
+
+A single `unveil()` call may specify multiple permission characters at once.
+Subsequent `unveil()` calls may take away permissions from the ones allowed
+earlier for the same file. Note that unveilng a path with any set of
+permissions does not turn off the regular permission checks: access to a file
+which the process has unvelied for itself, but has otherwise no appropriate
+permissions for, will still be rejected. Unveiling a directory allows the
+process to access any files inside the directory.
+
+Calling `unveil()` with both `path` and `permissions` set to null locks the
+veil; no further `unveil()` calls are allowed after that.
+
+The veil state is reset after the program successfully performs an `execve()`
+call.
+
+`unveil()` is intended to be used in programs that want to sandbox themselves,
+either to limit the impact of a possible vulnerability exploitation, or before
+intentionally executing untrusted code.
+
+## Return value
+
+If successful, returns 0. Otherwise, returns -1 and sets `errno` to describe
+the error.
+
+## Errors
+
+* `EFAULT`: `path` and/or `permissions` are not null and not in readable
+  memory.
+* `EPERM`: The veil is locked, or an attempt to add more permissions for an
+  already unvelied path was rejected.
+* `EINVAL`: `path` is not an absolute path, or `permissions` are malformed.
+
+All of the usual path resolution errors may also occur.
+
+## History
+
+The `unveil()` system call was first introduced by OpenBSD.
+
+## Examples
+
+```c++
+// Allow the process to read from /res:
+unveil("/res", "r");
+
+// Allow the process to read, write, and create the config file:
+unveil("/etc/WindowServer/WindowServer.ini", "rwc");
+
+// Allow the process to execute Calendar:
+unveil("/bin/Calendar", "x");
+
+// Disallow any further veil manipulation:
+unveil(nullptr, nullptr);
+```
+
+## See also
+
+* [`pledge`(2)](pledge.md)
+* [`chroot`(2)](chroot.md)