Base: Minor cleanup of a few man pages.

- Fix some typos and formatting.

- Add links to Mitigations from unveil / pledge.

3 files changed, 8 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/Base/usr/share/man/man2/pledge.md b/Base/usr/share/man/man2/pledge.md
index 51b1524265..2819062bb1 100644
--- a/Base/usr/share/man/man2/pledge.md
+++ b/Base/usr/share/man/man2/pledge.md
@@ -71,3 +71,4 @@ The `pledge()` system call was first introduced by OpenBSD. The implementation i
 ## See also
 
 * [`unveil`(2)](unveil.md)
+* [`Mitigations`(7)](../man7/Mitigations.md)
diff --git a/Base/usr/share/man/man2/unveil.md b/Base/usr/share/man/man2/unveil.md
index 9cdbc60adb..bc000009c7 100644
--- a/Base/usr/share/man/man2/unveil.md
+++ b/Base/usr/share/man/man2/unveil.md
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ include the following characters:
 
 A single `unveil()` call may specify multiple permission characters at once.
 Subsequent `unveil()` calls may take away permissions from the ones allowed
-earlier for the same file. Note that unveilng a path with any set of
+earlier for the same file. Note that unveiling a path with any set of
 permissions does not turn off the regular permission checks: access to a file
-which the process has unvelied for itself, but has otherwise no appropriate
+which the process has unveiled for itself, but has otherwise no appropriate
 permissions for, will still be rejected. Unveiling a directory allows the
 process to access any files inside the directory.
 
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ the error.
 * `EFAULT`: `path` and/or `permissions` are not null and not in readable
   memory.
 * `EPERM`: The veil is locked, or an attempt to add more permissions for an
-  already unvelied path was rejected.
+  already unveiled path was rejected.
 * `EINVAL`: `path` is not an absolute path, or `permissions` are malformed.
 
 All of the usual path resolution errors may also occur.
@@ -90,3 +90,4 @@ unveil(nullptr, nullptr);
 
 * [`pledge`(2)](pledge.md)
 * [`chroot`(2)](chroot.md)
+* [`Mitigations`(7)](../man7/Mitigations.md)
diff --git a/Base/usr/share/man/man7/Mitigations.md b/Base/usr/share/man/man7/Mitigations.md
index 426468ed86..966fe9a982 100644
--- a/Base/usr/share/man/man7/Mitigations.md
+++ b/Base/usr/share/man/man7/Mitigations.md
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ Author: Andreas Kling <awesomekling@gmail.com>
 Date:   Wed Jan 1 01:56:58 2020 +0100
 
 Kernel: Enable x86 SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection)
-
 ```
 
 ### SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
@@ -133,7 +132,7 @@ Kernel: KUBSAN! (Kernel Undefined Behavior SANitizer) :^)
 
 ### Kernel unmap-after-init
 
-Umap-after-init allows the kerenel to remove functions which contain potentially
+Umap-after-init allows the kernel to remove functions which contain potentially
 dangerous [ROP gadgets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Return-oriented_programming)
 from kernel memory after we've booted up and they are no longer needed. Notably the
 `write_cr4(..)` function used to control processor features like the SMEP/SMAP bits
@@ -158,7 +157,7 @@ Kernel: Add .unmap_after_init section for code we don't need after init
 in the linker and loader that hardens the data sections of an ELF binary.
 
 When enabled, it segregates function pointers resolved by the dynamic loader
-into a separate section of the runtie executable memory, and allows the loader
+into a separate section of the runtime executable memory, and allows the loader
 to make that memory read-only before passing control to the main executable.
 
 This prevents attackers from overwriting the [Global Offset Table (GOT)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Offset_Table).
@@ -218,8 +217,8 @@ Kernel+LibC: Build with basic -fstack-protector support
 ```
 
 It was later re-enabled and refined to `-fstack-protector-strong` in the following commits:
-```
 
+```
 commit fd08c93ef57f71360d74b035214c71d7f7bfc5b8
 Author: Brian Gianforcaro <b.gianfo@gmail.com>
 Date:   Sat Jan 2 04:27:35 2021 -0800