From 1c1b02874e1749d61b9b1680f744bf8470147416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?P=C3=81LI=20G=C3=A1bor=20J=C3=A1nos?= Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2022 14:47:25 +0100 Subject: Move to Linux 5.15.85 + Alpine 3.17.0. --- aports/wpa_supplicant/unsafe-renegotiation-1.patch | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 103 insertions(+) create mode 100644 aports/wpa_supplicant/unsafe-renegotiation-1.patch (limited to 'aports/wpa_supplicant/unsafe-renegotiation-1.patch') diff --git a/aports/wpa_supplicant/unsafe-renegotiation-1.patch b/aports/wpa_supplicant/unsafe-renegotiation-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0802a1b --- /dev/null +++ b/aports/wpa_supplicant/unsafe-renegotiation-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +Patch-Source: https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=566ce69a8d0e64093309cbde80235aa522fbf84e +From 566ce69a8d0e64093309cbde80235aa522fbf84e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 00:07:44 +0300 +Subject: EAP peer: Workaround for servers that do not support safe TLS + renegotiation + +The TLS protocol design for renegotiation was identified to have a +significant security flaw in 2009 and an extension to secure this design +was published in 2010 (RFC 5746). However, some old RADIUS +authentication servers without support for this are still used commonly. + +This is obviously not good from the security view point, but since there +are cases where the user of a network service has no realistic means for +getting the authentication server upgraded, TLS handshake may still need +to be allowed to be able to use the network. + +OpenSSL 3.0 disabled the client side workaround by default and this +resulted in issues connection to some networks with insecure +authentication servers. With OpenSSL 3.0, the client is now enforcing +security by refusing to authenticate with such servers. The pre-3.0 +behavior of ignoring this issue and leaving security to the server can +now be enabled with a new phase1 parameter allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1. +This should be used only when having to connect to a network that has an +insecure authentication server that cannot be upgraded. + +The old (pre-2010) TLS renegotiation mechanism might open security +vulnerabilities if the authentication server were to allow TLS +renegotiation to be initiated. While this is unlikely to cause real +issues with EAP-TLS, there might be cases where use of PEAP or TTLS with +an authentication server that does not support RFC 5746 might result in +a security vulnerability. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/crypto/tls.h | 1 + + src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 5 +++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c | 4 ++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 5 +++++ + 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls.h b/src/crypto/tls.h +index ccaac94c9..7ea32ee4a 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls.h ++++ b/src/crypto/tls.h +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct tls_config { + #define TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1 BIT(15) + #define TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_2 BIT(16) + #define TLS_CONN_TEAP_ANON_DH BIT(17) ++#define TLS_CONN_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION BIT(18) + + /** + * struct tls_connection_params - Parameters for TLS connection +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +index 388c6b0f4..0d23f44ad 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +@@ -3081,6 +3081,11 @@ static int tls_set_conn_flags(struct tls_connection *conn, unsigned int flags, + SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET); + #endif /* SSL_OP_NO_TICKET */ + ++#ifdef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT ++ if (flags & TLS_CONN_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION) ++ SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT); ++#endif /* SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT */ ++ + #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 + if (flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_0) + SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1); +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +index 06c9b211e..6193b4bdb 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ static void eap_tls_params_flags(struct tls_connection_params *params, + params->flags |= TLS_CONN_SUITEB_NO_ECDH; + if (os_strstr(txt, "tls_suiteb_no_ecdh=0")) + params->flags &= ~TLS_CONN_SUITEB_NO_ECDH; ++ if (os_strstr(txt, "allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1")) ++ params->flags |= TLS_CONN_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION; ++ if (os_strstr(txt, "allow_unsafe_renegotiation=0")) ++ params->flags &= ~TLS_CONN_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION; + } + + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +index a1dc769c9..b5304a77e 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +@@ -1370,6 +1370,11 @@ fast_reauth=1 + # tls_suiteb=0 - do not apply Suite B 192-bit constraints on TLS (default) + # tls_suiteb=1 - apply Suite B 192-bit constraints on TLS; this is used in + # particular when using Suite B with RSA keys of >= 3K (3072) bits ++# allow_unsafe_renegotiation=1 - allow connection with a TLS server that does ++# not support safe renegotiation (RFC 5746); please note that this ++# workaround should be only when having to authenticate with an old ++# authentication server that cannot be updated to use secure TLS ++# implementation. + # + # Following certificate/private key fields are used in inner Phase2 + # authentication when using EAP-TTLS or EAP-PEAP. +-- +cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 + -- cgit v1.2.3