From a33136265ac32307e3acf43175bbaf086963dc83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marcus Alves Grando <mnag@FreeBSD.org>
Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2007 15:40:39 +0000
Subject: - Enable ssl-engine - Update gsskex patch to 4.6p1-gsskex-20070312 -
Update lpk patch to 4.6p1-0.3.9 - Update hpn patch to 4.6p1-hpn12v17 - Fix
challenge-response issue - Bump PORTREVISION
Reported by: Stefan Lambrev [1], ale@ [1]
---
security/openssh-portable/Makefile | 14 +-
security/openssh-portable/distinfo | 15 +-
.../files/openssh-4.5p1-gsskex-20061220.patch | 2337 --------------------
.../files/patch-fix-challenge-response | 32 +
security/openssh-portable/files/scardpin.patch | 3 +
5 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 2349 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 security/openssh-portable/files/openssh-4.5p1-gsskex-20061220.patch
create mode 100644 security/openssh-portable/files/patch-fix-challenge-response
diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/Makefile b/security/openssh-portable/Makefile
index 8e57e2c36dcb..02efd78bcdaa 100644
--- a/security/openssh-portable/Makefile
+++ b/security/openssh-portable/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
PORTNAME= openssh
DISTVERSION= 4.6p1
+PORTREVISION= 1
PORTEPOCH= 1
CATEGORIES= security ipv6
MASTER_SITES= ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/%SUBDIR%/ \
@@ -41,8 +42,8 @@ USE_OPENSSL= yes
USE_PERL5_BUILD= yes
GNU_CONFIGURE= yes
CONFIGURE_TARGET= --build=${MACHINE_ARCH}-portbld-freebsd${OSREL}
-CONFIGURE_ARGS= --prefix=${PREFIX} \
- --with-md5-passwords --without-zlib-version-check
+CONFIGURE_ARGS= --prefix=${PREFIX} --with-md5-passwords \
+ --without-zlib-version-check --with-ssl-engine
PRECIOUS= ssh_config sshd_config ssh_host_key ssh_host_key.pub \
ssh_host_rsa_key ssh_host_rsa_key.pub ssh_host_dsa_key \
ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
@@ -100,7 +101,8 @@ CONFIGURE_ARGS+= --disable-suid-ssh
.if defined(KRB5_HOME) && exists(${KRB5_HOME}) || defined(WITH_GSSAPI)
.if defined(WITH_KERB_GSSAPI)
PATCH_DIST_STRIP= -p0
-EXTRA_PATCHES+= ${FILESDIR}/openssh-4.5p1-gsskex-20061220.patch
+PATCH_SITES+= http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/
+PATCHFILES+= openssh-4.6p1-gsskex-20070312.patch
.endif
PORTABLE_SUFFIX= # empty
GSSAPI_SUFFIX= -gssapi
@@ -145,14 +147,14 @@ BROKEN= HPN and LPK patches are incompatible
.if defined(WITH_HPN)
PATCH_DIST_STRIP= -p1
PATCH_SITES+= http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh/
-PATCHFILES+= openssh-4.6p1-hpn12v16.diff.gz
+PATCHFILES+= openssh-4.6p1-hpn12v17.diff.gz
.endif
# See http://dev.inversepath.com/trac/openssh-lpk
.if defined(WITH_LPK)
-PATCH_DIST_STRIP= -p1
+PATCH_DIST_STRIP= -p2
PATCH_SITES+= http://dev.inversepath.com/openssh-lpk/
-PATCHFILES+= openssh-lpk-4.5p1-0.3.8.patch
+PATCHFILES+= openssh-lpk-4.6p1-0.3.9.patch
USE_OPENLDAP= yes
CPPFLAGS+= "-I${LOCALBASE}/include -DWITH_LDAP_PUBKEY"
CONFIGURE_ARGS+= --with-libs='-lldap' --with-ldflags='-L/usr/local/lib' \
diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/distinfo b/security/openssh-portable/distinfo
index 68cb1588d42c..0d4fd0d47126 100644
--- a/security/openssh-portable/distinfo
+++ b/security/openssh-portable/distinfo
@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
MD5 (openssh-4.6p1.tar.gz) = 6a7fa99f44d9e1b5b04d15256e1405bb
SHA256 (openssh-4.6p1.tar.gz) = 7bbe277faa80c8d8d9cb96111db65fc0007d451784cc459207cd46b746a6f23a
SIZE (openssh-4.6p1.tar.gz) = 967395
-MD5 (openssh-4.6p1-hpn12v16.diff.gz) = 0bc643a4e1588f7abdcdbb31304bac56
-SHA256 (openssh-4.6p1-hpn12v16.diff.gz) = f304e3b04e2772c27c09e9aa5a3fd02747187a8775de39879c3d871fad1e156f
-SIZE (openssh-4.6p1-hpn12v16.diff.gz) = 15944
-MD5 (openssh-lpk-4.5p1-0.3.8.patch) = 663ce0f968c4f7eacc5128dc91645245
-SHA256 (openssh-lpk-4.5p1-0.3.8.patch) = c96cb24ea0c21cd93f2a28c31c38902bed8ddf0cb7a2879337bb21a5edd7ce35
-SIZE (openssh-lpk-4.5p1-0.3.8.patch) = 62340
+MD5 (openssh-4.6p1-gsskex-20070312.patch) = 9607f2faa8a50078d74f1169b5040599
+SHA256 (openssh-4.6p1-gsskex-20070312.patch) = d4f94d0a046ef1ada973faa4815d8af4d74ca068213e34b8537d6ac313895f92
+SIZE (openssh-4.6p1-gsskex-20070312.patch) = 69637
+MD5 (openssh-4.6p1-hpn12v17.diff.gz) = d5d4148c985c58a8784048edae9d8866
+SHA256 (openssh-4.6p1-hpn12v17.diff.gz) = 61438f6dc8959b038dee4fb365fe79b749053ccc149e768cdb73cb9c8740360b
+SIZE (openssh-4.6p1-hpn12v17.diff.gz) = 16145
+MD5 (openssh-lpk-4.6p1-0.3.9.patch) = f43a8aae7d69e72f0ec07bc96e46b328
+SHA256 (openssh-lpk-4.6p1-0.3.9.patch) = e12335e8bf020508ea3866db07b306f4c965e3f9de262c06f62fad494e93107e
+SIZE (openssh-lpk-4.6p1-0.3.9.patch) = 61605
diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/files/openssh-4.5p1-gsskex-20061220.patch b/security/openssh-portable/files/openssh-4.5p1-gsskex-20061220.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index edec24fcf326..000000000000
--- a/security/openssh-portable/files/openssh-4.5p1-gsskex-20061220.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2337 +0,0 @@
-#
-# http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh-4.5p1-gsskex-20061220.patch
-#
-Index: ChangeLog.gssapi
-===================================================================
-RCS file: ChangeLog.gssapi
-diff -N ChangeLog.gssapi
---- /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
-+++ ChangeLog.gssapi 20 Dec 2006 10:41:41 -0000
-@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
-+20061220
-+ - [ servconf.c ]
-+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
-+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
-+
-+20060910
-+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
-+ ssh-gss.h ]
-+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
-+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
-+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
-+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
-+ <Bugzilla #928>
-+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
-+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
-+ configuration files
-+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
-+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
-+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
-+
-+20060909
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
-+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
-+ only, where they belong
-+ <Bugzilla #1225>
-+
-+20060829
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
-+ variable
-+
-+20060828
-+ - [ gss-genr.c ]
-+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
-+ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
-+
-+20060818
-+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
-+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
-+ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
-+
-+20060421
-+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
-+ fix compiler errors/warnings
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+ fix uninitialized variable warnings
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ gssgenr.c ]
-+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <Bugzilla #1220 >
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
-+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
-+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
-+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
-Index: Makefile.in
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/Makefile.in,v
-retrieving revision 1.283
-diff -u -r1.283 Makefile.in
---- Makefile.in 23 Oct 2006 21:44:47 -0000 1.283
-+++ Makefile.in 20 Dec 2006 10:41:42 -0000
-@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
- atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
- monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
- kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
-- entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o
-+ entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o kexgssc.o
-
- SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
- sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o
-@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
- auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
- monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
- auth-krb5.o \
-- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
-+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
- loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o
-
-Index: auth-krb5.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.35
-diff -u -r1.35 auth-krb5.c
---- auth-krb5.c 5 Aug 2006 02:39:39 -0000 1.35
-+++ auth-krb5.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:42 -0000
-@@ -166,8 +166,13 @@
-
- len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
- authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
-+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#else
- snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
- authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -219,15 +224,22 @@
- #ifndef HEIMDAL
- krb5_error_code
- ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
-- int tmpfd, ret;
-+ int ret;
- char ccname[40];
- mode_t old_umask;
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
-+#else
-+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
-+ int tmpfd;
-+#endif
-
- ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
-- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-+ cctemplate, geteuid());
- if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
- return ENOMEM;
-
-+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
- old_umask = umask(0177);
- tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- umask(old_umask);
-@@ -242,6 +254,7 @@
- return errno;
- }
- close(tmpfd);
-+#endif
-
- return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
- }
-Index: auth.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.76
-diff -u -r1.76 auth.h
---- auth.h 18 Aug 2006 14:32:46 -0000 1.76
-+++ auth.h 20 Dec 2006 10:41:42 -0000
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
- int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */
- int attempt;
- int failures;
-+ int server_caused_failure;
- int force_pwchange;
- char *user; /* username sent by the client */
- char *service;
-Index: auth2-gss.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth2-gss.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.18
-diff -u -r1.18 auth2-gss.c
---- auth2-gss.c 1 Sep 2006 05:38:36 -0000 1.18
-+++ auth2-gss.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:42 -0000
-@@ -52,6 +52,39 @@
- static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
- static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-+/*
-+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
-+ */
-+static int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+ int authenticated = 0;
-+ Buffer b;
-+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
-+ mic.length = len;
-+
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+ "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
-+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ xfree(mic.value);
-+
-+ return (authenticated);
-+}
-+
- /*
- * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
- * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
-@@ -102,6 +135,7 @@
-
- if (!present) {
- xfree(doid);
-+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
- return (0);
- }
-
-@@ -109,6 +143,7 @@
- if (ctxt != NULL)
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
- xfree(doid);
-+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
- return (0);
- }
-
-@@ -291,6 +326,12 @@
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
- }
-+
-+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
-+ "gssapi-keyex",
-+ userauth_gsskeyex,
-+ &options.gss_authentication
-+};
-
- Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- "gssapi-with-mic",
-Index: auth2.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth2.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.142
-diff -u -r1.142 auth2.c
---- auth2.c 5 Aug 2006 02:39:39 -0000 1.142
-+++ auth2.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:42 -0000
-@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
- extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
- extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
- #endif
-
-@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@
- &method_none,
- &method_pubkey,
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+ &method_gsskeyex,
- &method_gssapi,
- #endif
- &method_passwd,
-@@ -199,6 +201,7 @@
- #endif
-
- authctxt->postponed = 0;
-+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
-
- /* try to authenticate user */
- m = authmethod_lookup(method);
-@@ -269,7 +272,9 @@
- /* now we can break out */
- authctxt->success = 1;
- } else {
-- if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
-+ /* Dont count server configuration issues against the client */
-+ if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
-+ authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
- #endif
-Index: configure.ac
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/configure.ac,v
-retrieving revision 1.370
-diff -u -r1.370 configure.ac
---- configure.ac 6 Oct 2006 23:07:21 -0000 1.370
-+++ configure.ac 20 Dec 2006 10:41:43 -0000
-@@ -403,7 +403,31 @@
- [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
- AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1,
- [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
-- ;;
-+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
-+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
-+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
-+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
-+ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1,
-+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
-+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
-+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
-+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
-+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
-+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
-+ [cc_context_t c;
-+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
-+ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1,
-+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
-+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
-+ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
-+ fi],
-+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
-+ )
-+ ;;
- *-*-dragonfly*)
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
- ;;
-Index: gss-genr.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/gss-genr.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.19
-diff -u -r1.19 gss-genr.c
---- gss-genr.c 30 Aug 2006 01:08:04 -0000 1.19
-+++ gss-genr.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:43 -0000
-@@ -39,12 +39,160 @@
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-+typedef struct {
-+ char *encoded;
-+ gss_OID oid;
-+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
-+
-+/*
-+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
-+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
-+ */
-+
-+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
-+
-+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
-+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
-+ *
-+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
-+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
-+ */
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host) {
-+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
-+ OM_uint32 min_status;
-+
-+ gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported);
-+
-+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
-+ host));
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
-+ const char *data) {
-+ Buffer buf;
-+ size_t i;
-+ int oidpos, enclen;
-+ char *mechs, *encoded;
-+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+ char deroid[2];
-+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
-+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
-+
-+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
-+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
-+ xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
-+ xfree(gss_enc2oid);
-+ }
-+
-+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
-+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
-+
-+ buffer_init(&buf);
-+
-+ oidpos = 0;
-+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
-+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
-+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), data)) {
-+
-+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
-+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
-+
-+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
-+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
-+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
-+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
-+
-+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
-+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+
-+ if (oidpos != 0)
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
-+ oidpos++;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
-+
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
-+
-+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
-+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
-+ buffer_free(&buf);
-+
-+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
-+ xfree(mechs);
-+ mechs = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (mechs);
-+}
-+
-+gss_OID
-+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
-+ int i = 0;
-+
-+ switch (kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ }
-+
-+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
-+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
-+ i++;
-+
-+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
-+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
-+
-+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
-+}
-+
- /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
- int
- ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-@@ -107,7 +255,7 @@
- /* The GSSAPI error */
- do {
- gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->major,
-- GSS_C_GSS_CODE, GSS_C_NULL_OID, &ctx, &msg);
-+ GSS_C_GSS_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
-
- buffer_append(&b, msg.value, msg.length);
- buffer_put_char(&b, '\n');
-@@ -118,7 +266,7 @@
- /* The mechanism specific error */
- do {
- gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->minor,
-- GSS_C_MECH_CODE, GSS_C_NULL_OID, &ctx, &msg);
-+ GSS_C_MECH_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
-
- buffer_append(&b, msg.value, msg.length);
- buffer_put_char(&b, '\n');
-@@ -226,45 +374,28 @@
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
--/* Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
-- * Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID
-- */
--
--/* Returns a GSSAPI error code */
- OM_uint32
--ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
-+ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
- {
-- OM_uint32 status;
-- char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
-- gss_OID_set oidset;
--
-- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
--
-- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- return (-1);
-- }
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-
-- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
-- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- return (ctx->major);
-- }
--
-- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
-+ if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
-- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
-+/* Priviledged when used by server */
- OM_uint32
--ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
-+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
- {
-- if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-- GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
-- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-@@ -281,22 +412,16 @@
- buffer_put_cstring(b, context);
- }
-
--OM_uint32
--ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
--{
-- if (*ctx)
-- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
-- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
-- ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
-- return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
--}
--
- int
- ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
- {
- gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- OM_uint32 major, minor;
- gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
-+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
-+
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ ctx = &intctx;
-
- /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
-@@ -315,7 +440,7 @@
- GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- }
-
-- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
-
- return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
-Index: gss-serv-krb5.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.17
-diff -u -r1.17 gss-serv-krb5.c
---- gss-serv-krb5.c 1 Sep 2006 05:38:36 -0000 1.17
-+++ gss-serv-krb5.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:43 -0000
-@@ -168,11 +168,16 @@
- return;
- }
-
-- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
-+ const char* new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
-+
- client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
-- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
-- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
-- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
-+ client->store.filename = NULL;
-+#else
-+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
-+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
-Index: gss-serv.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/gss-serv.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.22
-diff -u -r1.22 gss-serv.c
---- gss-serv.c 1 Sep 2006 05:38:36 -0000 1.22
-+++ gss-serv.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:43 -0000
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.20 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -43,8 +43,12 @@
- #include "channels.h"
- #include "session.h"
- #include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-@@ -65,6 +69,28 @@
- };
-
- /* Unprivileged */
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
-+ gss_OID_set supported;
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
-+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
-+ NULL));
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data) {
-+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
-+ int res;
-+
-+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-+
-+ return (res);
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
- void
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
- {
-@@ -89,6 +115,56 @@
- gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported);
- }
-
-+OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
-+{
-+ if (*ctx)
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
-+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
-+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
-+ return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
-+}
-+
-+/* Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
-+ * Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID
-+ */
-+
-+/* Returns a GSSAPI error code */
-+OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
-+{
-+ OM_uint32 status;
-+ char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
-+ gss_OID_set oidset;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
-+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+
-+ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
-+ NULL, NULL)))
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ } else {
-+ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+ }
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+}
-+
-
- /* Wrapper around accept_sec_context
- * Requires that the context contains:
-@@ -301,16 +377,6 @@
- else
- debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism");
- return (0);
--}
--
--/* Privileged */
--OM_uint32
--ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
--{
-- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
--
-- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
- #endif
-Index: kex.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/kex.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.83
-diff -u -r1.83 kex.c
---- kex.c 1 Sep 2006 05:38:36 -0000 1.83
-+++ kex.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:43 -0000
-@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
- #include "dispatch.h"
- #include "monitor.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- #define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16
-
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
-@@ -322,6 +326,20 @@
- } else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX_SHA256) == 0) {
- k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
- k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
-+#endif
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
-+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1;
-+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
-+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
-+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1;
-+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
-+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
-+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1;
-+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
- #endif
- } else
- fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
-Index: kex.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/kex.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.47
-diff -u -r1.47 kex.h
---- kex.h 5 Aug 2006 02:39:40 -0000 1.47
-+++ kex.h 20 Dec 2006 10:41:43 -0000
-@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@
- KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
- KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
- KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
-+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
- KEX_MAX
- };
-
-@@ -115,6 +118,11 @@
- sig_atomic_t done;
- int flags;
- const EVP_MD *evp_md;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ int gss_deleg_creds;
-+ int gss_trust_dns;
-+ char *gss_host;
-+#endif
- char *client_version_string;
- char *server_version_string;
- int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
-@@ -136,6 +144,11 @@
- void kexdh_server(Kex *);
- void kexgex_client(Kex *);
- void kexgex_server(Kex *);
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+void kexgss_client(Kex *);
-+void kexgss_server(Kex *);
-+#endif
-
- void
- kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
-Index: kexgssc.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: kexgssc.c
-diff -N kexgssc.c
---- /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
-+++ kexgssc.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:44 -0000
-@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
-+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
-+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
-+ DH *dh;
-+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
-+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
-+ char *msg;
-+ char *lang;
-+ int type = 0;
-+ int first = 1;
-+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+
-+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
-+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
-+
-+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
-+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group1();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group14();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
-+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+ packet_put_int(min);
-+ packet_put_int(nbits);
-+ packet_put_int(max);
-+
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+
-+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
-+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+
-+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
-+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
-+
-+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
-+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
-+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
-+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
-+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
-+
-+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
-+
-+ do {
-+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
-+
-+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+ &ret_flags);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ }
-+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+ }
-+
-+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+ xfree(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
-+
-+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+ */
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ if (first) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+ first = 0;
-+ } else {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ }
-+ packet_send();
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+
-+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+ do {
-+ type = packet_read();
-+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+ if (serverhostkey)
-+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+ serverhostkey =
-+ packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ }
-+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
-+
-+ switch (type) {
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
-+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
-+
-+ /* Is there a token included? */
-+ if (packet_get_char()) {
-+ recv_tok.value=
-+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+ } else {
-+ /* No token included */
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+ debug("Received Error");
-+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
-+ min_status = packet_get_int();
-+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
-+ default:
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+ type);
-+ }
-+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+ } else {
-+ /* No data, and not complete */
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+ }
-+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
-+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
-+ */
-+
-+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
-+
-+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
-+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
-+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
-+
-+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
-+ klen = DH_size(dh);
-+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
-+
-+ shared_secret = BN_new();
-+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf,kout, shared_secret);
-+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+ xfree(kbuf);
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
-+ kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ serverhostkey, slen, /* server host key */
-+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
-+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
-+ shared_secret, /* K */
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ kexgex_hash(
-+ kex->evp_md,
-+ kex->client_version_string,
-+ kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ serverhostkey, slen,
-+ min, nbits, max,
-+ dh->p, dh->g,
-+ dh->pub_key,
-+ dh_server_pub,
-+ shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = hash;
-+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
-+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
-+
-+ xfree(msg_tok.value);
-+
-+ DH_free(dh);
-+ if (serverhostkey)
-+ xfree(serverhostkey);
-+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-+
-+ /* save session id */
-+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+ else
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ kex_finish(kex);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-Index: kexgsss.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: kexgsss.c
-diff -N kexgsss.c
---- /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
-+++ kexgsss.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:44 -0000
-@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
-+{
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+ */
-+
-+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
-+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+ DH *dh;
-+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
-+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-+ int type = 0;
-+ gss_OID oid;
-+
-+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
-+
-+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
-+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
-+ * into life
-+ */
-+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
-+ ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+
-+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
-+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
-+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
-+
-+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
-+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group1();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group14();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ debug("Doing group exchange");
-+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+ min = packet_get_int();
-+ nbits = packet_get_int();
-+ max = packet_get_int();
-+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
-+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+ min, nbits, max);
-+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
-+ if (dh == NULL)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ packet_write_wait();
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+ do {
-+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
-+ type = packet_read();
-+ switch(type) {
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
-+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ recv_tok.length = slen;
-+
-+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
-+
-+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ recv_tok.length = slen;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ packet_disconnect(
-+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+ type);
-+ }
-+
-+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
-+
-+ xfree(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-+ fatal("No client public key");
-+
-+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+ }
-+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+ }
-+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
-+
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
-+
-+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
-+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-+
-+ klen = DH_size(dh);
-+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
-+
-+ shared_secret = BN_new();
-+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
-+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+ xfree(kbuf);
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ kex_dh_hash(
-+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
-+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ kexgex_hash(
-+ kex->evp_md,
-+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ NULL, 0,
-+ min, nbits, max,
-+ dh->p, dh->g,
-+ dh_client_pub,
-+ dh->pub_key,
-+ shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_free(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+ }
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = hash;
-+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
-+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
-+
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ } else {
-+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
-+ }
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+ else
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+ DH_free(dh);
-+
-+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ kex_finish(kex);
-+}
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-Index: key.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/key.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.70
-diff -u -r1.70 key.c
---- key.c 7 Nov 2006 12:14:42 -0000 1.70
-+++ key.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:44 -0000
-@@ -650,6 +650,8 @@
- return KEY_RSA;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0) {
- return KEY_DSA;
-+ } else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) {
-+ return KEY_NULL;
- }
- debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
- return KEY_UNSPEC;
-Index: key.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/key.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.28
-diff -u -r1.28 key.h
---- key.h 5 Aug 2006 02:39:40 -0000 1.28
-+++ key.h 20 Dec 2006 10:41:44 -0000
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- KEY_RSA1,
- KEY_RSA,
- KEY_DSA,
-+ KEY_NULL,
- KEY_UNSPEC
- };
- enum fp_type {
-Index: monitor.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.121
-diff -u -r1.121 monitor.c
---- monitor.c 7 Nov 2006 12:16:08 -0000 1.121
-+++ monitor.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:44 -0000
-@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@
- int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -232,11 +233,17 @@
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
- #endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
-+#endif
- {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
-@@ -341,6 +348,10 @@
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
-@@ -417,6 +428,10 @@
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-@@ -1660,6 +1675,11 @@
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+#endif
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
-@@ -1901,6 +1921,7 @@
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
- }
- return (0);
- }
-@@ -1951,4 +1972,42 @@
- /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
- return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+ gss_buffer_desc data;
-+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+ data.length = len;
-+ if (data.length != 20)
-+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, data.length);
-+
-+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
-+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
-+ session_id2_len = data.length;
-+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
-+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
-+ }
-+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
-+
-+ xfree(data.value);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
-+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
-+
-+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
-+
-+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-Index: monitor.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.21
-diff -u -r1.21 monitor.h
---- monitor.h 26 Mar 2006 03:30:02 -0000 1.21
-+++ monitor.h 20 Dec 2006 10:41:44 -0000
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
- MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
- MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
- MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
-Index: monitor_wrap.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor_wrap.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.70
-diff -u -r1.70 monitor_wrap.c
---- monitor_wrap.c 1 Sep 2006 05:38:37 -0000 1.70
-+++ monitor_wrap.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:44 -0000
-@@ -1224,4 +1224,27 @@
- debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
- return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+OM_uint32
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+ OM_uint32 major;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+
-+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
-+ hash->length = len;
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+ return(major);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-Index: monitor_wrap.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor_wrap.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.27
-diff -u -r1.27 monitor_wrap.h
---- monitor_wrap.h 5 Aug 2006 02:39:40 -0000 1.27
-+++ monitor_wrap.h 20 Dec 2006 10:41:44 -0000
-@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
- gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
- int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-Index: readconf.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/readconf.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.136
-diff -u -r1.136 readconf.c
---- readconf.c 1 Sep 2006 05:38:37 -0000 1.136
-+++ readconf.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:44 -0000
-@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@
- oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
- oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
- oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
-+ oGssKeyEx,
-+ oGssTrustDns,
- oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
- oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
- oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
-@@ -163,10 +165,14 @@
- { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
- #if defined(GSSAPI)
- { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
- #endif
- { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
- { "usersh", oDeprecated },
-@@ -441,10 +447,18 @@
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssKeyEx:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case oGssDelegateCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssTrustDns:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case oBatchMode:
- intptr = &options->batch_mode;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1010,7 +1024,9 @@
- options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
- options->gss_authentication = -1;
-+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
- options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
-+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -1099,8 +1115,12 @@
- options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
- if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
- options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
-+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-Index: readconf.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/readconf.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.63
-diff -u -r1.63 readconf.h
---- readconf.h 5 Aug 2006 02:39:40 -0000 1.63
-+++ readconf.h 20 Dec 2006 10:41:44 -0000
-@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@
- int challenge_response_authentication;
- /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
- int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
-+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
- int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
-+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
- int password_authentication; /* Try password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
---- servconf.c.orig Thu Mar 1 07:31:29 2007
-+++ servconf.c Mon Mar 12 18:09:49 2007
-@@ -90,7 +90,9 @@
- options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
- options->gss_authentication=-1;
-+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -204,8 +206,12 @@
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
- if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
-+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
-+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -290,7 +296,9 @@
- sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
-- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-+ sGssKeyEx,
-+ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand,
- sUsePrivilegeSeparation,
- sDeprecated, sUnsupported
-@@ -351,9 +359,13 @@
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
- { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
-@@ -872,8 +884,16 @@
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case sGssKeyEx:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case sGssCleanupCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
-+ case sGssStrictAcceptor:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
- goto parse_flag;
-
- case sPasswordAuthentication:
-Index: servconf.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/servconf.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.71
-diff -u -r1.71 servconf.h
---- servconf.h 18 Aug 2006 14:23:15 -0000 1.71
-+++ servconf.h 20 Dec 2006 10:41:45 -0000
-@@ -87,7 +87,9 @@
- int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
- * authenticated with Kerberos. */
- int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
-+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
- int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
-Index: ssh-gss.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/ssh-gss.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.11
-diff -u -r1.11 ssh-gss.h
---- ssh-gss.h 18 Aug 2006 14:46:44 -0000 1.11
-+++ ssh-gss.h 20 Dec 2006 10:41:45 -0000
-@@ -60,6 +60,17 @@
-
- #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
-
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
-+
- typedef struct {
- char *filename;
- char *envvar;
-@@ -97,6 +108,7 @@
- } Gssctxt;
-
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
-+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
-
- int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
-@@ -121,12 +133,19 @@
- int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
-
- /* In the server */
-+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *);
-+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
-+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *);
- int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
- void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-
-+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
-Index: ssh_config
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/ssh_config,v
-retrieving revision 1.24
-diff -u -r1.24 ssh_config
---- ssh_config 13 Jun 2006 03:01:10 -0000 1.24
-+++ ssh_config 20 Dec 2006 10:41:45 -0000
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
- # HostbasedAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
-+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
- # BatchMode no
- # CheckHostIP yes
- # AddressFamily any
-Index: ssh_config.5
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/ssh_config.5,v
-retrieving revision 1.97
-diff -u -r1.97 ssh_config.5
---- ssh_config.5 5 Aug 2006 01:34:51 -0000 1.97
-+++ ssh_config.5 20 Dec 2006 10:41:45 -0000
-@@ -479,11 +479,28 @@
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
-+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
- .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
-+Set to
-+.Dq yes
-+to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
-+the name of the host being connected to. If
-+.Dq no ,
-+the hostname entered on the
-+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
-Index: sshconnect2.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshconnect2.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.153
-diff -u -r1.153 sshconnect2.c
---- sshconnect2.c 1 Sep 2006 05:38:37 -0000 1.153
-+++ sshconnect2.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:45 -0000
-@@ -98,9 +98,34 @@
- {
- Kex *kex;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
-+ char *gss_host = NULL;
-+#endif
-+
- xxx_host = host;
- xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = host;
-+
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host);
-+ if (gss) {
-+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
- logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
- options.ciphers = NULL;
-@@ -128,6 +153,16 @@
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- options.hostkeyalgorithms;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+ "%s,null", orig);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (options.rekey_limit)
- packet_set_rekey_limit(options.rekey_limit);
-
-@@ -137,10 +172,21 @@
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+#endif
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
- kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
-+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
-+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
-+#endif
-+
- xxx_kex = kex;
-
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
-@@ -223,6 +269,7 @@
- void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
- void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
- #endif
-
- void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
-@@ -238,6 +285,10 @@
-
- Authmethod authmethods[] = {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {"gssapi-keyex",
-+ userauth_gsskeyex,
-+ &options.gss_authentication,
-+ NULL},
- {"gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
- &options.gss_authentication,
-@@ -500,6 +551,12 @@
- static u_int mech = 0;
- OM_uint32 min;
- int ok = 0;
-+ char *gss_host = NULL;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = (char *)authctxt->host;
-
- /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
- * once. */
-@@ -512,7 +569,7 @@
- /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
- if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
- ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
-- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
-+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host)) {
- ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
- } else {
- mech++;
-@@ -608,8 +665,8 @@
- {
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt;
-- int oidlen;
-- char *oidv;
-+ u_int oidlen;
-+ u_char *oidv;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
-@@ -716,6 +773,48 @@
- xfree(msg);
- xfree(lang);
- }
-+
-+int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+ Buffer b;
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ OM_uint32 ms;
-+
-+ static int attempt = 0;
-+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
-+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
-+ "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
-+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- int
-Index: sshd.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshd.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.361
-diff -u -r1.361 sshd.c
---- sshd.c 7 Nov 2006 12:14:42 -0000 1.361
-+++ sshd.c 20 Dec 2006 10:41:46 -0000
-@@ -117,6 +117,10 @@
- #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
- #include "version.h"
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #ifdef LIBWRAP
- #include <tcpd.h>
- #include <syslog.h>
-@@ -1476,10 +1480,13 @@
- logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
- }
-+#ifndef GSSAPI
-+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
- logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
- }
-+#endif
- if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
- logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
- exit(1);
-@@ -1754,6 +1761,60 @@
- /* Log the connection. */
- verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+ /*
-+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
-+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
-+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
-+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
-+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
-+ *
-+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
-+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
-+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
-+ * same session (bad).
-+ *
-+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
-+ * automatically.
-+ *
-+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
-+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
-+ */
-+ {
-+ OSStatus err = 0;
-+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
-+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
-+
-+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+ else
-+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+
-+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
-+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
-+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
-+ else {
-+ debug("Creating new security session...");
-+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+
-+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
-+ &sattrs);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+ else
-+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- /*
- * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
- * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
-@@ -2112,12 +2173,59 @@
-
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {
-+ char *orig;
-+ char *gss = NULL;
-+ char *newstr = NULL;
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
-+ * the other key exchange algorithms
-+ */
-+
-+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
-+ orig = NULL;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_keyex)
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+ else
-+ gss = NULL;
-+
-+ if (gss && orig)
-+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ else if (gss)
-+ newstr = gss;
-+ else if (orig)
-+ newstr = orig;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
-+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
-+ * host key algorithm we support
-+ */
-+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
-+
-+ if (newstr)
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
-+ else
-+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- /* start key exchange */
- kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+#endif
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
-Index: sshd_config
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshd_config,v
-retrieving revision 1.76
-diff -u -r1.76 sshd_config
---- sshd_config 24 Jul 2006 04:06:47 -0000 1.76
-+++ sshd_config 20 Dec 2006 10:41:46 -0000
-@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
-+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
-+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-Index: sshd_config.5
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshd_config.5,v
-retrieving revision 1.76
-diff -u -r1.76 sshd_config.5
---- sshd_config.5 30 Aug 2006 01:06:34 -0000 1.76
-+++ sshd_config.5 20 Dec 2006 10:41:46 -0000
-@@ -320,12 +320,35 @@
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
-+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
- .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
- Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
- on logout.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
-+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
-+a client authenticates against. If
-+.Dq yes
-+then the client must authenticate against the
-+.Pa host
-+service on the current hostname. If
-+.Dq no
-+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
-+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation
-+on multi homed machines.
-+The default is
-+.Dq yes .
-+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
-+and setting it to
-+.Dq no
-+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
- .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
- Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
- with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-fix-challenge-response b/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-fix-challenge-response
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e59aeab1d2c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-fix-challenge-response
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+#
+# Backported from OpenBSD:
+#
+# Move C/R -> kbdint special case to after the defaults have been
+# loaded, which makes ChallengeResponse default to yes again. This
+# was broken by the Match changes and not fixed properly subsequently.
+# Found by okan at demirmen.com, ok djm@ "please do it" deraadt@
+#
+--- servconf.c.orig 2007-08-30 11:50:17.000000000 -0300
++++ servconf.c 2007-08-30 11:50:38.000000000 -0300
+@@ -1387,8 +1387,4 @@
+ if (bad_options > 0)
+ fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
+ filename, bad_options);
+-
+- /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
+- if (options->challenge_response_authentication == 1)
+- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+ }
+--- sshd.c.orig 2007-08-30 11:50:30.000000000 -0300
++++ sshd.c 2007-08-30 11:51:42.000000000 -0300
+@@ -1421,6 +1421,10 @@
+ /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+ fill_default_server_options(&options);
+
++ /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
++ if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
++ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
++
+ /* set default channel AF */
+ channel_set_af(options.address_family);
+
diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/files/scardpin.patch b/security/openssh-portable/files/scardpin.patch
index 92f8d8d6232b..08fa40681755 100644
--- a/security/openssh-portable/files/scardpin.patch
+++ b/security/openssh-portable/files/scardpin.patch
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+#
+# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=608
+#
Index: scard-opensc.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/scard-opensc.c,v
--
cgit debian/1.2.3+git2.25.1-1-2-gaceb0