main/openssl: security upgrade to 3.3.2

Fix CVE-2024-6119: Applications performing certificate name
checks (e.g., TLS clients checking server certificates) may attempt to
read an invalid memory address resulting in abnormal termination of
the application process.

- https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20240903.txt

5 files changed, 6 insertions, 235 deletions

diff --git a/main/openssl/APKBUILD b/main/openssl/APKBUILD
index b237561dad3..7e7b0d399de 100644
--- a/main/openssl/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/openssl/APKBUILD
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 # Contributor: Timo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi>
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=openssl
-pkgver=3.3.1
+pkgver=3.3.2
 _abiver=${pkgver%.*.*}
-pkgrel=3
+pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="Toolkit for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"
 url="https://www.openssl.org/"
 arch="all"
@@ -15,17 +15,15 @@ makedepends_host="linux-headers"
 makedepends="$makedepends_host $makedepends_build"
 subpackages="$pkgname-dbg $pkgname-libs-static $pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc
 	$pkgname-misc::noarch libcrypto$_abiver:_libcrypto libssl$_abiver:_libssl"
-source="https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-$pkgver.tar.gz
-	CVE-2024-5535.patch
+source="https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-$pkgver/openssl-$pkgver.tar.gz
 	auxv.patch
-	fix-memleak.patch
-	fix-tserver.patch
 	man-section.patch
-	fix-fips-24661.patch
 	"
 builddir="$srcdir/openssl-$pkgver"
 
 # secfixes:
+#   3.3.2-r0:
+#     - CVE-2024-6119
 #   3.3.1-r1:
 #     - CVE-2024-5535
 #   3.3.0-r3:
@@ -238,11 +236,7 @@ _libssl() {
 }
 
 sha512sums="
-d3682a5ae0721748c6b9ec2f1b74d2b1ba61ee6e4c0d42387b5037a56ef34312833b6abb522d19400b45d807dd65cc834156f5e891cb07fbaf69fcf67e1c595d  openssl-3.3.1.tar.gz
-a208a2b43cb7a26367d380b4f68832392f38102fe811a3ec5772a2a69197c6441d48446db004aad891995f9b3cab7d1a96044b316e1c823596987fe1ca259d95  CVE-2024-5535.patch
+5ae47bf1aed2740a33ba5df7dc7345a6738aa6bfa3c9c4de5e51742485e24b25192988d7a2c1b8201ef70056ad8abd0ca78b3d55abe24c0b0373d83b47ed9b74  openssl-3.3.2.tar.gz
 63f7b46f11c222d2c49200f252937516cbca0bfeb475f008a18ad1abeb1d73110ba7a0506898353c8c6c760c5cb446215da7c83a420afa57e0d73f7fb8c3af7a  auxv.patch
-489f76eb9d96bee98182094dc10e8148f412876d9a6a3cbc230a0f1266c1f1972a401e10f7b4bad6cdfad02fbb9faffee457da3711b9e136b871f7e33aefb685  fix-memleak.patch
-8e3fc2f77294cc75e74b4210be37f2b277ac0612baee4cbc5e709b96af5cc37c09ceb3fa0103e3cff70e163bc3b67320a3331cd9309086f22c7cc2ca7a0dc985  fix-tserver.patch
 8c44e990fe8a820f649631b9f81cf28225b7516065169a7f68e2dd7c067b30df9b2c6cb88fa826afbc9fcdaf156360aabf7c498d2d9ed452968815b12b004809  man-section.patch
-4504118a65bfc93532d1b47950503e92e97ab294c7a0e1bf19e5adf2adf456d3a08ef15cf945cf8ed3dfc1d9f35893dde39c212de082bc9f5cef7271bcfc2007  fix-fips-24661.patch
 "
diff --git a/main/openssl/CVE-2024-5535.patch b/main/openssl/CVE-2024-5535.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2d0f822b25e..00000000000
--- a/main/openssl/CVE-2024-5535.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-From e86ac436f0bd54d4517745483e2315650fae7b2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix SSL_select_next_proto
-
-Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
-entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
-have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
-called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
-will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
-should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
-
-We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
-same for the server list while we are about it.
-
-CVE-2024-5535
-
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24716)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 2ebbe2d7ca8551c4cb5fbb391ab9af411708090e)
----
- ssl/ssl_lib.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
-index 5ec6ac4b63dc5..4c20ac4bf1fe7 100644
---- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
-@@ -3530,37 +3530,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
-                           unsigned int server_len,
-                           const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
- {
--    unsigned int i, j;
--    const unsigned char *result;
--    int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
-+    PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
-+
-+    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
-+            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
-+            || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
-+        *out = NULL;
-+        *outlen = 0;
-+        return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-+    }
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
-+     * a match.
-+     */
-+    *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
-+    *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
- 
-     /*
-      * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
-      */
--    for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
--        for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
--            if (server[i] == client[j] &&
--                memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
--                /* We found a match */
--                result = &server[i];
--                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
--                goto found;
-+    if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
-+        while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
-+            if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
-+                continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
-+            if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
-+                while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
-+                    if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
-+                                     PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
-+                        /* We found a match */
-+                        *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
-+                        *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
-+                        return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
-+                    }
-+                }
-+                /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
-+            } else {
-+                /* This should never happen */
-+                return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-             }
--            j += client[j];
--            j++;
-         }
--        i += server[i];
--        i++;
-+        /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
-     }
- 
--    /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
--    result = client;
--    status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
--
-- found:
--    *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
--    *outlen = result[0];
--    return status;
-+    /*
-+     * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
-+     * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
-+     */
-+    return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
- }
- 
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
diff --git a/main/openssl/fix-fips-24661.patch b/main/openssl/fix-fips-24661.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9be663304e3..00000000000
--- a/main/openssl/fix-fips-24661.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From 185da370be3b6284c4ba96471045745a140cb2cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 16:48:26 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix regression of EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info() with older
- providers
-
-If there is no get_ctx_params() implemented in the key exchange
-provider implementation the fallback will not work. Instead
-check the gettable_ctx_params() to see if the fallback should be
-performed.
-
-Fixes #24611
----
- crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c | 11 +++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
-index 0a561323f166e..71485c949cefd 100644
---- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
-+++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
-@@ -1008,6 +1008,7 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_add1_octet_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int fallback,
-                                           int datalen)
- {
-     OSSL_PARAM os_params[2];
-+    const OSSL_PARAM *gettables;
-     unsigned char *info = NULL;
-     size_t info_len = 0;
-     size_t info_alloc = 0;
-@@ -1031,6 +1032,12 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_add1_octet_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int fallback,
-         return 1;
-     }
- 
-+    /* Check for older provider that doesn't support getting this parameter */
-+    gettables = EVP_PKEY_CTX_gettable_params(ctx);
-+    if (gettables == NULL || OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(gettables, param) == NULL)
-+        return evp_pkey_ctx_set1_octet_string(ctx, fallback, param, op, ctrl,
-+                                              data, datalen);
-+
-     /* Get the original value length */
-     os_params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(param, NULL, 0);
-     os_params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-@@ -1038,9 +1045,9 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_add1_octet_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int fallback,
-     if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, os_params))
-         return 0;
- 
--    /* Older provider that doesn't support getting this parameter */
-+    /* This should not happen but check to be sure. */
-     if (os_params[0].return_size == OSSL_PARAM_UNMODIFIED)
--        return evp_pkey_ctx_set1_octet_string(ctx, fallback, param, op, ctrl, data, datalen);
-+        return 0;
- 
-     info_alloc = os_params[0].return_size + datalen;
-     if (info_alloc == 0)
diff --git a/main/openssl/fix-memleak.patch b/main/openssl/fix-memleak.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index db5a2eb08a3..00000000000
--- a/main/openssl/fix-memleak.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From fbd6609bb21b125c9454d07c484d166a33b4815b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: sgzmd <sigizmund@gmail.com>
-Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 15:53:32 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Free appname if it was set after initializing crypto.
-
-Fixes #24729
-
-CLA: trivial
-
-Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24730)
----
- crypto/conf/conf_sap.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c b/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
-index 3019bcf31af81..bfe3a5f6f4d5e 100644
---- a/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
-+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ void OPENSSL_config(const char *appname)
-         settings.appname = strdup(appname);
-     settings.flags = DEFAULT_CONF_MFLAGS;
-     OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, &settings);
-+
-+    free(settings.appname);
- }
- #endif
- 
diff --git a/main/openssl/fix-tserver.patch b/main/openssl/fix-tserver.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index aebe2f01fe1..00000000000
--- a/main/openssl/fix-tserver.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From fc8ff75814767d6c55ea78d05adc72cd346d0f0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:22:13 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Use correctly formatted ALPN data in tserver
-
-The QUIC test server was using incorrectly formatted ALPN data. With the
-previous implementation of SSL_select_next_proto this went unnoticed. With
-the new stricter implemenation it was failing.
-
-Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
-
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24716)
----
- ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c b/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
-index b9de60aea15fc..4f30eb14cec8d 100644
---- a/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
-+++ b/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
-@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static int alpn_select_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
- 
-     if (srv->args.alpn == NULL) {
-         alpn = alpndeflt;
--        alpnlen = sizeof(alpn);
-+        alpnlen = sizeof(alpndeflt);
-     } else {
-         alpn = srv->args.alpn;
-         alpnlen = srv->args.alpnlen;